



## AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT WITH THE EMERGING POWERS



MAY 2017

Edited by Edwin Rwigi, Programme Officer  
Emerging Powers Programme

## Table of Contents

---

<b>Acronyms and Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Executive Summary .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>1.0 Background .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>2.0 Civil Society in Africa.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>3.0 Study Methodology .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>PART A: a mapping of CSOs in the Emerging Powers in Africa discourse .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>4.1 Emerging Powers –Africa Knowledge Networks Based in Africa .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>4.2 Africa-Based Non Governmental Development Organisations.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>PART B: Survey of African Civil Society on their engagement in South-South Cooperation .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>5.1 Civil Society in Africa and the Emerging Powers.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>PART C: Civil Society Engagement Case Studies.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>6.1 Civil Society in Uganda and Tanzania.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>6.2 Tanzanian Civil Society perceptions of Chinese implemented infrastructural projects .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>6.3 Ugandan Civil Society perceptions on Chinese implemented infrastructural projects.....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>6.4 Discussion .....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>29</b>

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

---

<b>ACDP</b>	Africa-China Dialogue Platform
<b>AERC</b>	African Economic Research Consortium
<b>BAPENECO</b>	Bunyoro Albertine Petroleum Network on Environment and Conservation
<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
<b>BUCOSA</b>	Bunyoro Coalition on oil and sustainable livelihoods
<b>CBM</b>	Community-Based Monitors
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organization
<b>CCS</b>	Centre for Chinese Studies
<b>CNOOC</b>	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
<b>CODESRIA</b>	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>CSR</b>	Corporate Social Responsibility
<b>CUTS</b>	Consumer Unity and Trust Society
<b>EAC</b>	East African Community
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FOCAC</b>	Forum on China Africa Cooperation
<b>FYDP</b>	Five-Year Development Plan
<b>GEG</b>	Global Economic Governance – Africa
<b>HBS</b>	Heinrich Boll Stiftung
<b>HEP</b>	Hydro Electric Power
<b>INGO</b>	International Non Governmental Organization
<b>INT</b>	Interview

<b>NEMA</b>	National Environmental Management Authority
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organization
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development institute
<b>ORRA</b>	Oil Refinery Residents Association
<b>OSISA</b>	Open Society Initiative for South Africa
<b>SACE</b>	Sino Africa Centre for Excellence Foundation
<b>SAIIA</b>	South African Institute of International Affairs
<b>SGR</b>	Standard Gauge Railway
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

## Executive Summary

---

The Emerging Powers in Africa project has been and continues to be an analysis platform developing coherent knowledge frameworks on Africa's engagement with actors such as India, China, Turkey, Brazil, among others. Initiated in 2008, the primary focus of the project is to gauge the footprint and relationship that Africa crafts with these emerging economies based on the presumption that South-South Cooperation is as an alternative engagement for political, economic and development cooperation.

Over the years the strategic objective of Fahamu through its Emerging Powers in Africa project has been amplifying the voices of Civil Society actors contributing to South-South Cooperation discourse in Africa.

In situating African Civil Society in South-South Cooperation, this report examines the role of Civil Society actors in the South-South Cooperation discourse. Firstly the study examines the concept of Civil Society as applied in the Global South and most especially in South-South Cooperation related initiatives in Africa. After appreciating a conceptual foothold relevant for the subject matter, the report highlights different Civil Society actors in Africa who are actively engaged in the South-South Cooperation discourse along the themes of knowledge production and international development management.

In Part B of this report, the findings of an open Civil Society survey are discussed. This section highlights the different profiles of the study's participants and their different thematic interests. The report furthermore evaluates our participants' level of awareness and engagement in the South-South Cooperation discourse.

In Part C the report discusses community level case studies in Uganda's Albertine Graben region, and Tanzania's Tabora, Kigoma and Mwanza areas. These case studies too examine the level of Civil Society actors' perceptions, level and mode of engagement with Southern actors in their midst. This section discusses findings related to community based actors dependency on external funding, racialised labour relations and environmental concerns raised by local actors.

## 1.0 Background

---

Over the years the strategic objective of Fahamu Africa's Emerging Powers in Africa project remains one of enhancing Civil Society voices and perspectives on the emerging powers' footprint in Africa. In the course of our work with Civil Society actors, we have been exposed to a multitude of unexamined ideas relating to Africa's engagement with emerging powers, especially as it relates to the evolving presence of these emerging actors in the continent's development management discourse through South-South cooperation.

There is particularly an apparent lack in an integrated overview of Africa's own responses; the voices of Africa's Civil Society organization are seemingly muted in the South-South Cooperation discourse. Fahamu Africa seeks to provide a platform where these voices and responses can be integrated, developed and sustained through a focus on the role of Civil Society actors in this debate.

Fahamu's long-term goal is to strengthen the capacity of African Civil Society actors and promote African scholarship in South-South Cooperation. Consequently, Fahamu aims to promote and nurture a space and network sharing a common set of accountability benchmarks for South-South engagements. Towards this end, it is imperative for the Fahamu's Emerging Powers in Africa project to conduct a survey of knowledge frameworks, networks and capacities of Civil Society Organizations in respect to the emerging powers.

In the recent past, the emerging economies and the rise of South-South cooperation in trade and development has attracted much interest with an ever-growing body of literature on it. The discourse and analyses of South-South cooperation, and especially the Emerging Powers in Africa, is however primarily focused only on the international political economy dynamics of inter-state interactions. What therefore arises is a striking silence on the potential emergent social arrangements linked to the so-called South-South Cooperation. Additionally, it has been noted that African Civil Society either marginally participates in the discourse or is altogether left out of it (Alden, et al., 2016; Carayannis & Olin, 2012; Poskitt, et al., 2016; Sen, 2000).

It is in this context – a discourse about Africa, bereft of African Civil Society voices – and an evolving geo-strategic landscape in Africa, that Fahamu seeks to encourage the robust engagement of Civil Society actors in monitoring and understanding of the Emerging Powers' presence on the continent.

The absence of clear African Civil Society frameworks in South-South cooperation puts Africa at a risk of poor accountability mechanisms in resource governance, development management and human rights observance (John, 2012).

It is in this sense therefore that the potential reactions of Africa's Civil Society and its success in influencing policy processes will determine Africa's engagement with new development partners at the national, regional and continental levels.

## 2.0 Civil Society in Africa

---

The concept Civil Society is highly contested being abstracted to express a varied number of political sociology traditions and contexts (Laine, 2014).

Wnuk-Lipinski & Bukowska (2011) broadly conceptualize Civil Society from a political sociology perspective to mean the kind of society whose members bear 'attitudinal capabilities', which means the ability for collective action in pursuit of common goals; and the institutional frameworks within which the said members operate. It is from this understanding that they posit that any analysis of Civil Society is on either the grounds of the 'attitudinal' or 'institutional' arrangements.

Citizenship is the central idea in the attitudinal definition of Civil Society. This definition emphasises the agency of an individual as a social actor in society.

The Institutional definition on the other hand emanates from the notion of social structure, thereby understanding Civil Society as "an arena of citizens' activity embedded in an institutional framework."

It is in this second context of the sum total of "institutions, organization and associations operating in the public sphere" that the modern understanding of Civil Society lies. Key attributes of this kind of Civil Society are: relative autonomy from state and market, and a voluntary basis of membership.

Regardless of the conceptual basis of either definition, Wnuk-Lipinski & Bukowska contend that Civil Society as a concept is profoundly tied to both the notions of "collective and individual autonomy and political sovereignty," at the core of which is a notion of how the society 'ought' to be organized – with the assumption that society is composed of free and equal citizens.

Shivji (2007) traces the rise of the contemporary 'institutional' movement of Civil Society in Africa with the neo-liberal era starting in the 1980s at which point Africa was democratizing whilst the Soviet was unravelling. With the rolling back of the state occasioned by the era, Civil Society organization especially in the global South sought to fill in the social gaps and needs left by the neo-liberal state.

Civil Society in this sense expanded to include human rights organizations and networks, grassroots and village organizations, professional unions, religious groups,

and development non-governmental organizations (Brown, Naidoo, & Khagram, 2011; Shivji, 2007).

This contemporary usage of the term Civil Society in Africa goes hand in hand with the notions of 'good governance' policies, which gained currency in the 1990s. At this point Civil Society came to be associated with development donor agencies and Non Governmental Organizations both of which were either direct or indirect agents of neo-liberal democratic values. This new emerging NGO sector attempted to arguably mitigate the distortions of the market mechanism that had neglected the provision of quality social services (Lewis, 2002). Consequently, the utility of the concept Civil Society as both a tool of analysis and policy design in the African context has particularly been queried for various reasons (Lewis, 2002). Both historical purists and critical theorists have criticized this understanding of Civil Society. The former insist that it is not congruent with the historical Western-European experience, whilst the latter are cynical of the buzzword status 'Civil Society' has acquired as a tool for neo-liberal modernization agenda in the development discourse (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Lewis, 2002).

Poskitt et al. (2016) in situating the role of Civil Society in South-South Cooperation desist from defining it in the broad sense as merely the associations and socio-occupational bodies that make up the world of associational life. They narrowly operationalize the concept to mean the formally structured social collectives and organizations "with a history of engagement in project implementation, policy dialogue and/or public debate in relation to issues of social and economic development." In this sense, Civil Society organizations are therefore often seen as intermediaries between the citizenry and instruments of the state, seeking to promote public interests through public policy formulation and advocacy, and shaping of public opinion and awareness (Poskitt et al., 2016; UNESCO, 2009).

The contemporary mandate of the Civil Society is to lobby on behalf of the citizen as was described above. However, in the context of the Emerging Powers in Africa discourse, there is a remarkable absence of an African Civil Society narrative lending its weight to the conversation. The experience, expertise and stake that the African Civil Society could claim in South-South Cooperation processes is only too obvious, but is unfortunately under-registered, unsolicited, and at worst barely existing (Vaes & Huyse, 2013). The African epistemic community is particularly limited despite growing numbers of public policy think tanks on the continent. Additionally, many African universities draw and compete from a very limited resource pool thereby affecting their general research outputs and influence let alone having impact in what is seen as a niche sector (Carayannis & Olin, 2012; John, 2012; Oxfam, 2016a).

Naidu (2011) underscores the insufficiency of relevant technical resources needed by African Civil Society in their analyses and engagement with the Emerging Powers. It is on this basis that we therefore query whether the tried and tested social justice praxis of African Civil Society, which includes different forms of social protest and



organizing, are relevant in designing and marshalling a cogent response to the Emerging Powers evolving presence in Africa.

### 3.0 Study Methodology

---

Appreciating the broader role of Civil Society in Africa and growing South-South cooperation and exchanges, Fahamu is keen to understand in what ways these two sectors interact. Towards this end, this report seeks to accomplish the following: map African Civil Society knowledge networks working around South-South exchanges; profile Civil Society actors, their interest and level of engagement in this thematic area; and lastly derive lessons from anecdotal experiences of grassroots actors concerning South-South exchanges.

The project employs a mixed method approach, which entails a review of literature and desktop study, online surveys and case-study research. The project design of this research project is therefore broken into three complementing sections.

#### Part A

In this section, the report describes the findings of a desktop review that yielded and highlighted Civil Society actors – that is non-state and non-market aligned organizations – engaged in the Emerging Powers in Africa discourse.

This section highlights two dimensions of Civil Society work, namely knowledge generation and developmental project implementation. As such, the broad categories of Emerging Powers–Africa Knowledge Networks, and Non Governmental Development Organisations are employed for this purpose.

#### Part B

This section describes the findings of an online survey, which sought to understand the level of Civil Society engagement in South-South cooperation and its impact on policy making.

The survey invited the participation of Civil Society Organizations in general (i.e. NGOs; Think Tanks; Media Houses; Labour Unions; Professional Unions; Universities) in reviewing the sector's level of engagement with the Emerging Powers in Africa.

This survey was non-probabilistic in nature. It attracted the participation of actors from 26 different countries participated in the survey, most of whom were from East and Southern Africa.

## Part C

This section is composed of two case studies in Uganda and Tanzania and focussed on Chinese infrastructural projects in localities in this two East African countries. The case studies employed a qualitative research design. Data was collected through interviews, discussion guides and focus group discussions with Civil Society actors comprised of grassroots, community based organizers and community development agents. Civil Society Organizations and actors were identified based on their participation and reputation in local development networks. Only non-governmental and community-based organizations that were operational in the communities along the infrastructure of interest -- central railway line were in Tanzania, and Albertine Graben region in Uganda.

For the Tanzanian case a total of 50 organizations were randomly selected from a list of registered Civil Society organizations established and working in areas along the existing railway line from Dar es Salaam through Tabora to Kigoma and Mwanza. Only 40 of the identified 50 organizations had their representatives participating in the study through semi-structured interviews and location-based Focus Group Discussions.

The Ugandan case focused on the oil rich the Mid West of Uganda, in the Albertine Graben Area. The case covered seven districts: Hoima, Masindi, Kiryandongo, Buliisa, Kagadi, Kibaale and Kakumiro.

At least two FGDs were conducted in each of these districts. A total of 28 CSOs and 7 local and grassroots media outfits participated in the study.

Both the Tanzanian and Uganda case used a purposive and non-probabilistic sampling method, with respondents having been pre-determined.

## PART A: a mapping of CSOs in the Emerging Powers in Africa discourse

## 4.1 Emerging Powers – Africa Knowledge Networks Based in Africa

---

### *Stellenbosch University: Centre for Chinese Studies (CCS) – South Africa*

The Centre for Chinese Studies based at Stellenbosch University is a pioneer research institution in Sub-Sahara in all matters China and East Asia. The centre's core mandate is in the analysis of emerging trends in China-Africa engagements.

The CCS was instituted as a collaborative initiative in 2004 following a Bi-national commission between the governments of South Africa and China. Initially the centre housed the Confucius Institute at Stellenbosch, but later on fully dedicated itself to China-Africa policy-relevant research and analysis (Carayannis & Olin, 2012; CCS, 2016).

The CCS also publishes on a monthly basis the China Monitor, and the CCS Weekly briefing both capturing Sino-Africa engagements in development cooperation and assistance, environment policy, trade and investment (Carayannis & Olin, 2012).

### *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) – Senegal*

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) traces its roots back in the early 1970s as the premiere pan-African social science organization committed to social science research analysis and cataloguing (Bujra, 2003; Carayannis & Olin, 2012; CODESRIA, 2016).

In its mandate to promote the holistic and multidisciplinary production of African knowledge through social science research, CODESRIA is committed to filling the knowledge gaps in the Sino-Africa discourse (Carayannis & Olin, 2012; CODESRIA, 2016).

### *African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) – Kenya*

The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) was founded in 1988 as a centre committed to promoting economic policy research and economic policy research capacities in Africa for better economic management in sub-Saharan Africa. The AERC has made analyses on the impact of China-Africa economic engagement on some East, West and Central African countries, which it has published as policy briefs (AERC, 2016; Carayannis & Olin, 2012).

*South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) – South Africa*

Voted as the leading sub-Saharan think tank five consecutive times (2009-2013), the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) is a centre for research excellence on South Africa's and Africa's international relations along the themes of social development, foreign policy, governance and economic policy.

SAIIA's conducts research and analyses on South-South cooperation on trade, development, politics and diplomacy. SAIIA runs a China-in-Africa research project, which generated the China-Africa fact sheet and the China-Africa toolkit – the later being a continental research catalogue of bilateral relationship between African countries and China.

In collaboration with Global Economic Governance (GEG) Africa and Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) International, SAIIA has as well developed a BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) Guide which is an electronic resource tracking the evolution of the BRICS collective (Alden et al., 2016; Carayannis & Olin, 2012; SAIIA, 2016).

*China-Africa Reporting Project – South Africa*

The University of the Witwatersrand's department of Journalism hosts the Wits China Africa Reporting Project. The project was initiated in 2009 through a funding grant from the Open Society Foundation. The mandate of the project is to enhance both the quality and quantity of journalistic reporting on China in view of its rise and influence in Africa. The Project continues to address issues around the many myths, uncertainties and generally poor reporting of the role of China in Africa, not just in economic spheres but also in such fields as politics, diplomacy, and the environment. The goal of the project is to promote objective and balanced reporting on China-Africa relations.

Additionally, the project conducts capacity building workshops for African journalists and offers research grants to African journalists covering China-Africa stories.

The project has published and produced resources such as the 'Fair China-in-Africa Investigations', and a multimedia guide to covering the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) conference called 'Reporting FOCAC' – this is in collaboration with the multimedia resource programme China Africa Project (Wits Journalism, 2016).

*Sino Africa Centre for Excellence (SACE) Foundation – Kenya*

The Sino Africa Centre of Excellence (SACE) Foundation is a Nairobi based Think Tank whose core mandate is to promote China-Africa economic exchanges through trade and investment. SACE operates as a one-stop advisory shop cum applied Think Tank for both Chinese business interests in Africa or African business interests in China. In line with this objective SACE also offers work placements for university graduates from China and Africa.

SACE's flagship research publication was the "China Business Perception Index: Survey on Chinese Companies' Perception of Doing Business in Kenya," which sought to understand the attributes of Chinese companies in Kenya and how the business environment and culture impacted on their productivity (Carayannis & Olin, 2012; SACE, 2016).

## 4.2 Africa-Based Non Governmental Development

### Organisations

---

*China House – Kenya*

China House is a relatively new start up NGO whose core mandate is to "integrate the Chinese into Africa." The primary target clientele for China House is Chinese business in Africa. China House as an organization is keen to harness African based Chinese business' corporate social responsibility capacities for social integration in African communities. (Li, 2015; Liu, 2016).

*Oxfam International*

Oxfam International is an international non-governmental development organization whose core mandate is poverty alleviation and promotion of equality across all aspects of life. As a non-governmental development organization, Oxfam International has a dedicated policy and research component, which informs the organization's rights-based approach to development practice and campaigns.

Through their policy and research component and in collaboration with the Oxfam African Union Office based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Oxfam International in March of 2016 launched the Africa-China Dialogue Platform (ACDP). The objective of the ACDP is to promote and facilitate meaningful and constructive policy dialogue and partnership between Chinese and African citizens, policy researchers and stakeholders.

The ACDP is keen to undertake policy research around the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) along the themes of agriculture, sustainable development and climate change, and peace and security.

Since its inception the ACDP produces a monthly newsletter, The Africa China Dialogue Platform Newsletter, in line with the platform's strategic objectives (ACDP, 2016; Oxfam, 2016b).

Oxfam Novib and Oxfam India, as international affiliates have over the years also demonstrated a keen interest in matters China and Emerging Powers in Africa.

Oxfam India is particularly keen to have the participation of Civil Society organizations in the proceedings and evolution of the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) collective (Oxfam, 2016a).

### *Heinrich Boll Foundation – East and Horn Africa (Kenya)*

The Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBS) is a governance international non-governmental organization keen to promote democracy and human rights. HBS is an affiliate of the German Green Party.

The HBS East and Horn Africa office based in Nairobi has in the past hosted dialogue platforms between African Civil Society leaders, Chinese researchers and policy makers in the evolving discourse on China-Africa cooperation.

HBS has also in the past offered field visits to researchers and policy practitioners for learning and analysis on new and evolving development models emerging from China-Africa cooperation (HBS China, 2014).

### *Fahamu Africa – Kenya*

Fahamu is a pan-African organisation that collaborates with social movements and grassroots organizations to tackle the causes of social injustice in Africa. Fahamu's mandate is to strengthen and nurture movements for social justice by generating and sharing knowledge to serve activism; bridging the gap between theory and practice; capacity building for Civil Society actors; public policy advocacy and creating platforms for analysis and debate.

Through its Emerging Powers in Africa project, Fahamu Africa has provided an analysis platform of coherent knowledge frameworks on Africa's engagement with actors such as India, China, Turkey, Brazil, among others. The project's objective is to promote rigorous knowledge production informing Civil Society engagement and advocacy in the Africa-Emerging Powers engagement (Fahamu Africa, 2016).

### *Open Society Initiative for South Africa*

The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) is a constituting office of the Open Society Foundation. OSISA's core mandate is the promotion of democracy and good governance and human rights advocacy. OSISA's work on South Africa often is intertwined with the evolving Emerging Powers, especially China and the BRICS, in Africa (Carayannis & Olin, 2012).


## **PART B: Survey of African Civil Society on their engagement in South-South Cooperation**

### **5.1 Civil Society in Africa and the Emerging Powers**

---

Respondents from 26 different countries participated in the survey; Kenya, South Africa and Uganda were best represented with 15.3%, 13.6%, and 6.8% of the participants coming from these countries respectively.

Participants identifying and affiliated to NGOs accounted for a majority of the respondents at about 27%. Those that identified as African Think Tanks and Academia came in second at about 22%. The least represented group was that of respondents affiliated to Local Media, at 6%.



About 65% of the respondents say that their organizations have at one time managed an Emerging Powers in Africa related project.

About 22% of all respondents indicated their thematic interest to be in Governance, Social Justice and Human Rights. Economic and Development Policy as a thematic interest followed at 17%. Public Finance was the least engaged in thematic area of the respondents, registering a meagre 6%.

## Accessibility of resources/funding to organizations working in the area

Generally, most of the respondents felt that funding for Civil Society in Emerging Powers in Africa programmes is insufficient with about 17% and 22% of them registering it as either “none existent” or “hard to come by” respectively.

50% of respondents who described their organization as either being community based organizations or grassroots organisations described their programmatic funding options as being “non-existent” (this is about 17% of all respondents who felt funding was non-existent).

Also about 33% and 16% of all CBO/Grassroots respondents thought that funding was “hard to come by”, and “Good” respectively. All of the organizations represented



in this category rely on Official Development Assistance (ODA) channels for programmatic support.

The responses from self described African Think-tanks or Academia were evenly distributed across the three funding scales of “Non-Existent”, “Hard to Come by” and “Good” at about 33% each. Most of the funding for these groups is evenly sourced from African Governments and ODA.

Respondents who identified as being from NGOs and INGOs registered “Non-Existent” funding options for running Emerging Powers in Africa projects at 45% and 44% respectively (cumulatively about 53% of all respondents who felt that funding was “Non-Existent”). These two groups also registered about 18% and 33% respectively on funding being “Hard to come by”.

The NGO/INGO group accounted for about 58% of all the respondents that felt that funding was “Good.”

Out of all the respondents that felt funding was “Good”, the NGO/INGO group accounted for about 58% of all responses.

About 75% of NGO funding is sourced from conventional ODA channels, whilst groups identifying as INGO exhibiting slightly more diversified source of funding beyond the ODA architecture.


All the respondents who described themselves as Local media felt that there was no funding to access while another about 33% described it as “hard to come by”.

A response of note was that the existing global funding architecture was more inclined to fund mainstream NGOs than they are to fund Social Movements.

### **CSOs platforms for Emerging Powers-Africa issues**

The BRICS Think Tank Council, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation – South-South Cooperation CSO platform, and the China-Africa Think Tank Forum, are the most popular Civil Society platforms having recorded about 17%, 16% and 15% familiarity respectively.

The China Think Tank Forum and the BRICS Think Tank councils are the most popular platform for African Think Tanks/Academia at about 25% and 19% participation respectively.

**Figure 1: Platforms familiar to African Civil Society Actors**

Source: Survey Monkey

Most CBO/Grassroots organizations are familiar with the China-Africa Think Tank Forum, the India Africa Forum Summit and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation – South-South Cooperation CSO platform.

An overwhelming 90% of all respondents felt that Civil Society is not 'Sufficiently Represented' in the South-South engagements. Of the 10% that felt the contrary, 40% were Think Tanks/Academia and 20% were NGOs.

### Role of African Civil Society in South-South Cooperation

The unanimous response was that Civil Society has a role to play in South-South multilateralism.

Of all respondents, 42% of them felt that the role of Civil Society in South-South Cooperation should be in governance related issues such as Democracy and Human

Rights, Inclusion, Transparency and Accountability – the idea of a ‘watch dog’ was registered severally.

It was suggested that issues around human rights and good governance are overlooked by multilateral state-state engagements. “Shrinking Space” and enabling environment for Civil Society was identified as a growing concern.

Only 11% of the respondents felt that Civil Society should engage in South-South Trade and Investment. Most of these happened to be in CBO/Grassroots organization at 29%, and NGO at 17%. The interests in advocacy work around economic and trade-justice stood out in this respect.

Dialogue, Cooperation, Learning and Collaboration featured as a priority for Civil Society Organization at 35%, with African Think Tanks and Academia representing 40% of these.

It would seem that there are greater opportunities for exchanges between Think Tanks and Academia in the Emerging Powers discourse than with any other category of Civil Society; these exchanges are most often than not supported by state organs.

### **CSO representation in multilateral exchanges and South-South Cooperation**

The general feeling was that Civil Society is under-represented in all aspects of South-South Cooperation engagements in Africa – this was at 89%.

On how to correct this, collaboration between global south Civil Society Organizations was suggested – for learning, exchange and synergy in engaging multilateral processes.

The lack of African Civil Society capacity and tools to engage multilateral process was however outlined as an impediment to effective engagement. This could be attributed to limited access to funding.

The need for Civil Society participation in the various South-South multilateral platforms was also highlighted – first in the existing frameworks, and then in new created spaces.

### **Membership to a Civil Society network on South-South Cooperation**

Interest in joining and participating in a Civil Society Network on SSC was unanimously registered. 36% of the respondents indicated their interests in participating in joint programmes; events and campaigns; and debates and forums. Policy advocacy and advice, and knowledge generation and research, also garnered interest at 27% and 23% respectively.

## PART C: Civil Society Engagement Case Studies

### 6.1 Civil Society in Uganda and Tanzania

---

#### General Background – China’s evolving presence in Africa

Over the past 15 years, Chinese investments in Africa have steadily increased with China becoming Africa’s largest trading partner. International economic diplomacy inspired by principles of South-South cooperation has accompanied this increased interdependence.

*Much as literature on China-Africa economic relations abounds, there are continuing misperceptions about these relations. Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence on the policy tools that underpin China’s economic diplomacy in Africa and how they affect the conduct of Chinese companies (Cotula, Weng, Ma & Ren, 2016).*

#### General Study objectives

The overall objective of this bit of the study was to understand the level at which Civil Society Organizations engage with thematic areas tied to China – Africa relations. The study sought to understand in what ways CSO actors are using their work for impact or influence on policy in the discourse of emerging powers in Africa, and establish the general perceptions of CSOs of China-Africa relation

#### General Research Questions

1. What is the community’s/grassroots’ experience of China-Africa infrastructural projects?
2. How does local Civil Society interpret the behaviour/activities of the Chinese in you country?
3. How is your country benefiting and losing from the engagement with China?
4. What opportunities does the engagement with the Chinese present to social movements and other citizen organizations for advancing their own interests and the interests of the oppressed through playing one imperial power against another?
5. Do Chinese corporate policies /practices influence the work of CSOs or vice versa?
6. What kind of response is most appropriate in dealing with the social justice issues and impacts that the Chinese are producing, as they rapidly garner relations with your government?

7. Do existing methods of social protest and grass-root strategies applicable in formulating Civil Society response to China's burgeoning relationship with your country?

## 6.2 Tanzanian Civil Society perceptions of Chinese implemented infrastructural projects

---

### Introduction

Tanzania's bilateral relations with China go back to the 1960s, with relations being expanded from mere ideological support to include political and economic aspects.

As with most of Africa, China's presence and exchanges with Tanzania have steadily increased in the last two decades.

The Government of Tanzania is currently implementing its second Five Year Development Plan (FYDP II), 2016/17 – 2020/21, whose focus is on "Nurturing an Industrial Economy". A major prerequisite in implementing the strategy is ensuring reliable soft and hard infrastructure across the country.

The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) line is envisioned as one of such strategic infrastructural investments that are imagined to spearhead Tanzania's industrialization. Having been conceived during the Kikwete administration, the SGR, which was to replace Tanzania's century-old railway system, was much debated during its conceptualization. It is during Magufuli's presidency that the vision of the SGR has begun to take shape.

With Tanzania serving as a gateway country in East and Central Africa, the SGR is seen as a strategic investment that will further open up the region's hinterland thereby promoting trade in the greater East African Community (EAC) and the recently proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area. These economic interests arguable justify the urgency with which the project is being implemented.

At the national level, in line with the broader industrialization effort, the SGR is also seen as crucial infrastructure needed in attracting FDI for natural resource extraction and processing.

Currently the Tanzanian government is mobilizing for resources for this 1,400-kilometer railway line running from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza and Kigoma. In February of 2017, a Chinese construction company was awarded the contract to work on a 300-kilometer section between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro.

Tanzania's bilateral relations with China are widely acknowledged in Tanzania. There are however mixed perceptions about the nature of these relations ranging from support from the local business community, and suspicion by the media and Civil Society. With NGOs and Community Based Organizations representing a broad constituency in this latter community, there is need to understand their perceptions of these bilateral relations, both the apparent and the imagined.



*Clarifying interview responses with NGO leaders in Mwanza Region*

## **Key Findings – Tanzania**


In this section of the report highlights the key findings of the Tanzanian bit of the study. The unit of analysis and primary data source being Civil Society actors, the report hereby provides an overview synthesis and analysis of mostly qualitative data pertaining to grassroots awareness, experiences, challenges and perspectives on South-South Cooperation in the context of Chinese infrastructural projects.

## **Thematic interests of Civil Society organizations**

The study through a survey was first keen to establish the type, thematic interest and nature of work of our respondents. About 58% of our survey respondents identified themselves as organizations working in community development; whilst around 28% of them work in governance – which includes social justice and human rights; and about 15% engage in the environment, natural resources and climate change space.

Of all of our respondents none of the surveyed organizations had ever undertaken any project/program focusing on Chinese presence in their community or any other Sino-Tanzania related work.

*Figure 1: Interviewed organizations thematic interests*



Source: Coded interviews with CSOs, retrieved from Microsoft Office Excel 2007



*An interview with a Community Based Organization leader in Shinyanga Region*



### Local CSOs on Chinese presence in Tanzania

From our FGDs we sought to elicit our respondents' general perceptions of South-South Cooperation between Tanzania and China in the context of their communities. The FGDs overwhelmingly registered a distrust and suspicion over Chinese activities in Tanzania.

A general perceived concern of our respondents was Chinese expatriates' withdrawn and unsociable attitude towards the locals. Further to these, it was reported that Chinese contractors, unlike other foreign contractors, are neither eager to engage with the communities nor their leaderships. This experience was attributed to a socio-cultural difference between the Chinese and the locals.

This supposedly nonchalant non-participatory approach was further credited to the reported non-compliance of the Chinese in contributing to community development projects and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives. It was however unclear how this level of corporate engagement has come to be an expected output for the local CSOs.

Additionally, our CSO respondents also expressed their disappointment in the Chinese contractors over the lack of programmatic support for their organizations. Again, it was unclear how this expectation came to be.

Some of the common interview and FGD responses of interest, reflecting the above thoughts, are as captured below:

The local Civil Society fraternity has mixed perceptions of Chinese presence. Some consider the presence – behaviour and activities – as detrimental to community livelihoods.

*Chinese projects are not providing employment opportunities for local people; they bring their people for project labour even for the low skill jobs that the local could easily qualify for. (Int-3)*

In the same breath, there are those that see Chinese presence as a positive development. These assert that:

*The Chinese have contributed to the competitive stimulation of our local economies; the locals are themselves learning from the Chinese way of working. (Int-3)*



On the Chinese way of life, it was observed that unlike other expatriate contractors, the Chinese comfortably adapt to modest standard of living, which the respondents described as “local living conditions”.

*The Chinese contractors live in the settlements where the locals reside; and they even surprisingly do their own household chores. (Int-8)*

In spite of the close living proximity, it was however reported that Chinese companies paid low wages and humiliated their local workers.

A widely registered sentiment and expectation is that the companies running projects in and around local communities need to firstly build cordial relationships with both these communities and their local organisations by contributing to local development in whatever way.

*The Chinese companies are perceived as not being socially responsible. They neither engage with local communities nor contribute to community development activities in such ways as providing funding support to local Civil Society organizations. (Int-9)*

It was also reported that the Chinese implement projects of poor quality, which are hardly implemented according to schedule – delays are assumed to inflate project costs.

The matter of wage/compensation discrimination was again highlighted, whereby our respondents felt that:

*Local labourers are underpaid, which consequently has led to inter-racial strife. (FGD-2)*

### **Impact of Chinese business on local communities**

Our study respondents had varying perceptions on the impact of Chinese business activities on local communities. While some respondents commended the availability of cheaper goods – despite being of low quality – and contribution to national revenues through duties, taxes and levies, others felt that their low-cost goods and level of business innovation is cause of unfair competition and hostile business environment for local entrepreneurs.

Some of these sentiments were captured during interviews and FGDs as follows:

*The Chinese business activities receive a lot of attention in my community because their products are available at cheap prices, although in most cases they are of low quality. (Int-1)*

*The Chinese business activities contribute a lot in my community because their products are available in large quantity and cheaper. Every community member even those of low income can afford Chinese products. (Int-12)*

*The presence of Chinese business activities is good news for us because they challenge us to compete in manufacturing of standard and quality goods... we then learn from Chinese innovation and products. (Int-25)*

*Should they observe Tanzanian laws in their business ventures, their (Chinese) presence will then positively contribute to national income. (FGD-1)*

*Our government has poor quality control mechanisms, which allow poor quality Chinese products to penetrate our markets... all the same the Chinese are good in business. (FGD-2)*

### **Country and community benefits or loss from engagement with China**

The study participants were prompted for their views on Tanzania's balance sheet (national and local level) of engagement with China. Most of the feedback rated the overall exchanges with China as being beneficial to the country and local communities.

Below are the descriptions from both 'the benefiting' and 'the losing' sides.

Assertions from 'the benefits' perception side:

*My country/community is benefiting more than it is losing from the engagement with China. The Chinese are diversely involved in different sectors of the economy*

*including infrastructure projects. The Chinese have contributed to growth of cities in Tanzania through infrastructure and trading... consequently they are raising Tanzania's national income and creating employment opportunities. (Int-3)*

*Yes... We benefit much because we get new technologies, skills, products and sometimes trainings through interactions within the Chinese companies. (Int-4)*


*Through investment China has created employment opportunities to the youth, which contribute to growth of national income through taxes and levy collection... Scholarships are also being provided to Tanzanian wishing to study in China. (FGD -1)*

Assertions from 'the loss' perception side:

*The influx of Chinese low-quality product unfairly competes with the indigenous products thereby threaten the growth of local industries. (Int-1)*

*The Chinese only concentrate on that which that brought them to the country. They do not care much about anything else. No, they do not bring overall benefit... they do offer any support to the community. (Int-18)*

**Figure 2:** *Is your country /community benefiting or losing from engagement with China? How?*



### Community access to information regarding Chinese infrastructural projects

Perhaps not being unique to Chinese implemented projects, the overall perception at the grassroots level is that local communities and actors are hardly 'in-the-know' regarding government-initiated initiatives in and around them.

Most of participants suggest that the locals, including their civic and development community based organizations, had limited levels of awareness of the workings of Chinese infrastructural projects.

The following responses were registered through Interviews and Focus Group Discussion:

*The community members are still not well aware of the particulars of Chinese infrastructural projects. (Int-7)*

*The community's/grassroots' awareness experience of the Chinese infrastructural projects is different here... in urban areas people have substantial awareness and experience... but in rural areas people have little interactions with such and therefore awareness and experience of the Chinese infrastructural projects are very limited. (Int-22)*

*There is little or no awareness and experience of Chinese interactions at the local level. They just work with the propagated assumptions based on such things like Chinese goods, to judge the quality of Chinese-built infrastructures often as untrustworthy. (FGD-1)*

*The grassroots' awareness and experience of Chinese infrastructural projects is very limited with some projects, which are implemented by the Chinese in Tanzania under government contracts are not communicated to local communities. (FGD-1)*



*A Focus Group Discussion in Mwanza*

### **Opportunities for social movements for engagement in South-South Cooperation**

The study also explored the perceived opportunities for social movements and community based organizations engagement in the South-South Cooperation space for pursuing community and grassroots interests.

Our respondents' general perception was that there are hardly any opportunities for them to participate in this manner.

These sentiments were captured as seen below:

*There are few opportunities for social movements and other citizen organizations to participate in South-South exchanges. Such groups lack the platform on which they can advance their interests and the interest of marginalized groups through engagement with the Chinese... I don't see Chinese involvement in social issues like Western organizations and countries. (Int-4)*

*I have not seen any opportunities for social movements and other citizen organizations for advancing their own interests and the interest of marginalized groups... the government is best poised for such exchanges, they seem to enjoy a direct link to the Chinese. (FGD-1)*

### **Impact of Chinese presence on grassroots social justice concerns**

The general belief of our respondents was that the Chinese had little concern with issues of human and especially labour rights as contractors. The matter of environmental sustainability was also highlighted with concerns over natural resource management being registered.

Some bold unverifiable assertions also came up such as the role of the Chinese in labour exploitation, increased unemployment and increase in street children.

The following are responses from our Interviews and Focus Group Discussions:

*Chinese projects exploit labour... Chinese imports further bring about the decline of local businesses... (Int-3)*

*Yes! A lot of them are illegal immigrants - this leads to high levels of unemployment... The Chinese are also harassing their workers. They offer poor wages, which they often delay in paying. (Int-15)*

*The social justice issues and impacts emerging from the Chinese investment and business practices are especially in employment and environment where working conditions are unfair and wages are too low. Also there are reports of humiliation in mining site and other Chinese camps -- for example one recent accident in Geita gold mining is a case in point. (Int-36)*

*Yes... in the past months a Chinese company working in mining degraded water catchment areas and led to water shortages in villages in Geita. (FGD-1)*

*The presence of street children is a source of Chinese investment and business practices...immediately after having children with local women they disappear once the projects end. (FGD-2)*

### **Sino-Tanzania state relations and social justice issues**

In exploring possibly ways in which the community could engage with Chinese-related social justice concerns as mentioned above, our respondents proposed lobbying the government to enforce migration and labour laws; engaging with Chinese companies for dialogues, and mobilizing the community actors and stakeholders in condemning unfair corporate practices.

The following the responses were registered through Interviews and Focus Group Discussions:

*I believe issues of social justice can be best addressed through mass awareness and advocacy campaigns; my organization is involved in this kind of work in Misungwi District, Mwanza Region. Effective implementation of laws and diplomatic terms should be adhered to insure social justice in the community and social welfare. (Int-8)*

*Government corporate accountability mechanisms should be employed in monitoring Chinese work. (Int-12)*

*A Strong immigration framework able to track and monitor immigrants should be enforced... The Ministry of Works should as well play a role in monitoring the Chinese in Tanzania's construction industry. (Int-15)*

*In collaboration with Civil Society organization, the government should monitor and audit Chinese labour camps to ensure they adhere to set regulations and permits. (Int-20)*

*Civil Society and Community Based Organizations should raise their voice in holding the government responsible for ensuring foreign contractors adhere to set regulation. (Int-27)*

*Other than mobilizing for advocacy campaigns, there is need for civil education for community/grassroots actors for a better understanding of their roles in engaging with Chinese actors. (FGD-2)*

### **ole of community based organizations in Sino-Tanzania relations**

In trying to understand the perceived roles of Civil Society organization in the engagement between the Chinese and their government, most of the respondents surprising indicated that they have no role to play at the community level. It would seem that their understanding of their roles is predicated on an idea of 'invited spaces.' For our respondents the idea of their own 'created spaces' of advocacy seems to elude them. They indicated that the Chinese are only keen on government



-contracted infrastructural work without much interest in engaging with them as grassroots organizations/Community based organizations.

Many of our respondents did indicate that they had no knowledge of any opportunities for formal engagement with Chinese companies or development institutions.

Through our development work with communities, we have not seen any opportunity for grassroots or Civil Society organizations in the engagement between the Chinese and the government. Neither the Chinese nor the government provides space for dialogue and exchanges whereby local organizations can explore working relations with the companies.

*We in Civil Society have the general impression that culturally, unlike say the Westerners in Tanzania, Chinese way of life and culture is somewhat insular. (FGD -2)*

### **Challenges experienced while working in the above area**

Our respondents articulated some of the challenges they have experienced in an attempt to engage in the South-South Cooperation space with the Chinese. They highlighted Chinese insularity and reluctance in engaging with local Civil Society group, and government protection of Chinese interests, as key challenges for Civil Society work.

On whether Chinese companies were ready to contribute to local development through funding support to local organizations, the overall response from both interviews and Focus Group Discussions was:

*The present challenge is the Chinese companies are not willing to provide funding for grassroots organizations/Community based organizations/Civil Society organizations in local development. (Int-7)*

*The challenge is...there is no routine follow up information between the Chinese and Tanzania government leading to information blackouts in the community. (Int -11)*

*I'm have mixed feelings about projects implemented by Chinese companies in my community... It is never clear when the projects are scheduled to begin or end. There are always delays in implementation. (FGD-1)*



### Participation in South-South Cooperation Networks

The study was able to establish that none of our respondents had ever been part of any network of Civil Society organizations working on issues relating to China's presence and impact on communities.

A majority of our respondents were open to the idea of joining a Civil Society coalition engaging in South-South Cooperation issues and discourses in their country and in Africa at large (see figure 3 below).

Our respondents were keen to participate in the following areas in this regard:

Multi stakeholder dialogues, Governance, social justice and human rights, Lobby groups on community issues, Policy and guideline review, contract review, and Participating in relationship building on culture and social justice

The above was captured in their responses as shown below:

*We would wish to participate through multi-stakeholder dialogues to discuss various policy and regulatory concerns on community economic development. (Int-4)*


*We are keen to participate in advocacy campaigns and community and stakeholders training and capacity building for those actors engaging with Chinese projects. (Int-8)*

*Through awareness and advocacy campaigns on the negative and positive impacts in our engagement with the Chinese companies. (Int-33)*

*In emphasizing on the strong social relationship in work area among Chinese and locals...good payment rates...and job opportunities to be provided to local people. (Int-40)*

*We would wish to participate in review processes examining FDI policy and guidelines, and corporate contracting. (FGD-1)*

**Figure 3:** Would you be open to the idea of joining a Civil Society coalition participating in the South-South Cooperation discourse in your country and in Africa at large?



Source: Coded interviews with CSOs, retrieved from Microsoft Office Excel 2007

### 6.3 Ugandan Civil Society perceptions on Chinese implemented infrastructural projects in the Albertine Graben Region

---

#### Introduction

China-Uganda relations have a long history going back to early 1960s at the time when Uganda was attaining its independence. Over the course of the follow two decades, in spite of a number of regime changes in Uganda, the two country maintained stable relations and exchanges (Guloba, Kilimani, & Nabiddo, 2010; Obwona, Guloba, Nabiddo, & Kilimani, 2007).

Uganda was amongst the African caucus in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that in 1971 voted in favour of the formal membership and recognition of the People's Republic of China in the international institution. The diplomatic relations between these two countries would only grow with Yoweri Museveni's rise to power in Uganda in 1986. Uganda has demonstrated its support for China severally by backing Chinese positions and agenda at the United Nations (UN).

These diplomatic exchanges have also expanded to include economic and cultural exchanges too. In the early 1960s China invested in Ugandan infrastructure in various sectors of the economy like agriculture, housing, transport and energy. It was up until the early 1990s than Uganda experience a sustained influx of Chinese small-scale entrepreneurs. By the 2000s Chinese business interests had expanded into import and export logistics, construction, textile, footwear and so on (Obwona et al., 2007).

Today China is Uganda's biggest trading partner having traded an estimated USD 640 million in 2015. The balance of trade is skewed in China's favour with China exporting about USD 550 million to Uganda (Ntambirweki & Barungi, 2016).

China has furthermore invested an estimated USD 2.2 billion and is reported to inject about USD 4-5 million annually in development assistance in Uganda (Guloba et al., 2010; Ntambirweki & Barungi, 2016).

Major Chinese investments in Uganda today are in the energy (petroleum and HEP) sector, manufacturing, industrial parks, and road and housing construction (Ntambirweki & Barungi, 2016).

The Albertine Lakes Basin has particularly attracted Chinese attention after the discovery of commercially viable oil reserves in the region in 2006 (Gelb & Majerowicz, 2011).



*A focused group Discussions in Masindi district*

## Research Findings

The study's findings, in line with the study's objectives, highlight perceptions CSOs hold of the presence and activities of the Chinese in Uganda in general, the impact of this presence on communities, and the possible roles and opportunities CSOs (including grassroots and community based organizations) have in the China-Uganda exchanges.

### General Civil Society perceptions of Chinese presence and activities in Uganda's Mid-Western region

The general perception of the Chinese is that their engagement in the communities and in the region are purely commercial, "business not charity work." Overall, their presence has mixed reviews. The Chinese are for example being positively rated for their diligent work-culture on one hand, and being vilified for environmental degradation – the infrastructural projects in Bulimya – Hoima, Kabwooya – Kyanjojo, Masindi – Kigumba, and Karuma, are cited as cases in point of Chinese flouting of environmental regulations.

Findings also interestingly suggest that, compared to other foreign investors in the area, the Chinese are the most transparent; the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) which operates in Hoima- Buhuka at Kingfisher area, is cited as an example. According to our respondents, CNOOC normally informs various stakeholders about the particulars of on-going projects through public participation.

Be this as it may, about 60% of the respondents however indicated that most Chinese firms in Uganda do not integrate a Human Rights approach when conducting business. Chinese actors were further described as 'not put on a human face' in their business interactions with Ugandans; it was alleged that the Chinese are rude, not 'people-centered, and only driven to make gains for their companies.

It was also reported that Chinese contractors overworked and underpaid their casual laborers and sometimes terminated their contracts without fair hearing. Our respondents cited the Buhima-Kabwooya road project as a case on poor wages – UGX 50,000 a month. This was described as a mockery of Ugandans given the increasing cost of living in the country.

The level of transparency of Chinese actors was brought to question; some of our respondents considered them very 'secretive' and deliberate in the manner with which they manage information access to particularly Civil Society, which includes local media.

In assessing the Kigumba-Kyenjojo and Mubende – Kagadi road projects, the Chinese were somewhat fairly evaluated. It was however noted that they were keen to please and attend to the desires of government agencies and agents than those of the affected communities.

In this area, the affected communities were seemingly denied information pertaining to the projects. Community grievances were inadequately addressed with the contractors referring the affected to government officials who are hardly accessible. The design and implementation of these infrastructural projects follows an absolute top-down approach that not only excludes the input of affected communities but also bypasses district and local governments. Decision-making is a product of exclusive national government – Chinese contractors interactions.

Other than the above concerns, the respondents in the Kigumba-Kyenjojo and Mubende – Kagadi area highlighted the reckless driving of project employees as a community concern. This is reported to have claimed the lives of six people, which has included a primary school student at Kicede Muslim Primary School who died in July 2016.

A general concern was that the country was being mortgaged to the Chinese, who are in turn taking it over. Again the concern over environment protection and regulated natural resource extraction was highlighted.

### **The perceived impact of the Chinese in local communities**

A majority of our CSO respondents, 90% of them, feel that that infrastructural development in Uganda and the Mid-Western Region in specific is overall leading to gradual positive social transformation. The example of the Buhuka – Rwamagali road project is cited as improving access to the region thereby promoting ease of doing business in the area.

About 50% of our respondents felt that the presence of the Chinese has had an impact on their communities on account of employment creation by projects albeit the prevailing grievances on race-based wage and employment discrimination.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) efforts by Chinese companies were appreciated as being of positive impact. CNOOC was particularly appreciated for its sponsoring of a local football tournament, the Masaza Cup in the Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom. Such efforts are seen to promoting and nurturing the talents of the area youths.

CNOOC was also reported of giving grants to some local CSOs, examples of beneficiaries include Meeting Point Hoima and Better World Uganda – these two

organizations engage in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention advocacy in the areas of Embegu and Kaiso Tonya along the shores of Lake Albert in Hoima District.

The respondents also believe, that through CNOOC's enabling, these sensitization programs are making local communities more pro-active and better informed when addressing the scourge of HIV/AIDs in their communities.

CNOOC is further reported to give scholarships to local best performing students; the respondents see that such initiatives will promote the overall welfare of the community.

Other than HIV/AIDS awareness, Better World Uganda is reported to be conducting road-use and road-safety programmes in communities along the Hoima Kaiso Tonya Road with the financial support of a Chinese company. It is alleged that an average of about six deaths per month were in the past reported along this road; the situation was reported to have greatly improved since.

Other significant efforts include the sponsoring of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programmes in the Lake Albert area. This has brought about an investment in community wells, which has consequently reduced the rates of communicable diseases like cholera in Buhuka, Kyangwali Hoima District.

Many local farmers are said to have benefited from the expansion of a fresh produce market on account of the presence of Chinese companies in the communities. As such, the quality of life of the said farmers is thought to consequently improve in tandem with their expanding economic power.



*A section of the Chinese Roads construction in Buhuka-Kyangwali*



Much as the presence of the Chinese in the Mid-Western region received positive reviews, there those among our respondents that felt that the Chinese had little positive impact in the communities primarily on account of wage and employment discrimination. The 'importation' of Chinese labour was particularly criticized by these respondents who felt it took away employment opportunities for Ugandans.

These also felt local farmers did not benefit from an expanded market as was reported by other respondents. These respondents suggest that the immigrant Chinese people were only keen to consume products of certified commercial producer and not from the small and informal local farmers.

Perceived benefits and losses at the local and national level from China-Uganda interactions

All the 28-interviewed CSOs respondents felt that the people of Bunyoro and the country at large are benefiting in one way or another from China's engagement with Uganda. Infrastructural projects in the Mid-Western region like roads and the hydroelectric power dams such as the Karuma Dam in Kiryandongo District are positively rated as they are expected to promote industrialization in this part of the country and thereby improving citizen's welfare through economic empowerment.

The construction of the Entebbe express highway was also rated as a project that will accrue national benefits; our respondents believe that this highway will better integrate Uganda into the East African Community.

The Hoima-Tanga crude oil Pipeline project was particularly perceived as beneficial to Uganda's nascent petroleum industry. This pipeline, according to our respondents, will provide the needed infrastructure for the quick and efficient access to the East African energy market and East African international ports of exit for the international crude markets. Consequently, in the long term, Uganda's foreign exchange prospects, according to our respondents, are very bright.

Further to the above, our respondents felt that the pipeline project will also promote good bilateral relations with Uganda's neighbor, Tanzania.

Chinese CRS programmes were as well seen as beneficial outcomes of China-Uganda relations as expressed in the communities. Again, the work of CNOOC in education sponsorship in Bunyoro was highlighted as a positive step in empowering the hitherto marginalized communities.

Be this as it may, concern was raised about Uganda's debt sustainability with its mounting Chinese loans. Most of the Chinese projects in the county are funded by long-term Chinese loans, which Ugandans will have to pay back in future. Some respondents said that the Chinese Government, through China's EXIM Bank, has offered the government of Uganda big loans with a promise of repayment through Ugandan oil and gas. The CSOs of Bunyoro think that Uganda's oil has been

mortgaged out to the Chinese and are not hopeful for sustained future benefits from the industry.

The downside to the above-celebrated projects, like the Hoima-Tanga crude oil Pipeline, is the associated negative externalities impacting on the environment and other social concerns. Our respondents felt that should these projects not be better managed they would compromise the overall human development of communities living in the Mid-Western region.

This project is said could affect sensitive ecologies in both Uganda and Tanzania. With a significant length of the Tanga branch running through protected areas in Tanzania (Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania and Kabwoya Wildlife Reserve, Uganda) and other ecologically sensitive hotspots in Uganda, some respondents felt that the tourism sector in this region could be affected in the long run.

### **Grassroots actors and their experiences of Chinese infrastructural projects**

Most of our respondents believe that the quality of Chinese projects is suspect; there is concern that the projects will wear out sooner than anticipated.

The respondents tie the supposed poor quality of projects to government corruption, whereby chains of 'kick-backs' flow through every step of project design stages. This therefore compromises the quality of work delivered by Chinese contractors.

It is the belief of our respondents that Uganda's procurement processes are subject to a deliberately inefficient bureaucracy, which is neither transparent nor accountable to the public.

The structural integrity of the Karuma Dam, the latest infrastructural installation by a Chinese company, is reportedly being questioned, this was after cracks started showing. The government has since ordered for a re-doing of the work.

Drawing comparisons with other international construction companies in the Mid Albertine Graben, respondents are of the opinion that Chinese roads for example are narrower and are of sub-standard quality. The Kiso – Tonya Road, built by a Turkish contractor, was invoked as a reference point for good, quality workmanship.

Most Communities know little about the particulars of Chinese projects; majority of the respondents said that they are hardly consulted about 'Chinese undertakings'. Most of the Chinese companies rarely provide space for information sharing or engagement with the general public of Civil Society groups.



The respondents also expressed their concerns over issues around environmental conservation. The Kigumba-Bulima-Kabwooya-Kyenjojo roads project was particularly cited as being detrimental to sustainable ecosystems.

Furthermore, incidents of ‘stray stones’ or blasting projectiles and heavy dust were reported in Buhimba Sub County during the quarrying process; these are said to have posed great public health threats to the people living in this area.

### **Likely opportunities for Civil Society engagements with the Chinese**

Our respondents identified direct engagement with project funding agencies like China’s EXIM Bank and the World Bank as CSOs’ strategy for ensuring monitoring, transparency and accountability of Chinese and other foreign contractors like Tullow Oil. This would put pressure on these firms to adhere to international standards of best practice. The need for advocacy campaigns was highlighted. About 70% of our respondents thought that labour rights are pertinent concerns that need to be addressed in regard to Chinese implemented projects.

The need for the creation of a regional platform focusing on workers’ and labour rights was suggested. The respondents also highlighted the need for general human rights engagements and empowerment, citing cases of gender-based acts of violence perpetrated during the construction of the Kamwenge Fort portal road.

Some of the advocacy activities suggested include civic education on human rights and public participation, and ‘social-contracting’ between state agents, local politicians and communities. These activities would create platforms for monitoring, transparency and accountability for responsive leadership.

The respondents also suggested that CSOs could lobby for contractors in collaboration with government agency to incorporate the provision of social services in their project work.

### **Appropriate responses in dealing with the Chinese regarding social justice issues**

Most respondents suggested that there was need for direct multi-stakeholder dialogues with Chinese companies to foster conversations around social and environmental justice. Majority of the CSO respondents called for round table dialogues or “baraza” meetings as platforms for public participation, information dissemination and accountability.

It was suggested that local investors and the Ugandan government tend to be more responsive to certain forms of public participation than others – petitions and protests are seen to elicit response better than dialogues and so called ‘round-table’ dialogues. The power dynamic between citizens/Civil Society and contractors or

government (Ugandan or otherwise), arguably tilts to the side of the citizens when the public image of relevant actors is seemingly shamed. Respondents from Hoima District shared a case in point where mounting public pressure led by the Oil Refinery Residents Association (ORRA) through protests forced the hand of the government in demanding for accountability on project timelines from RTI International; RTI International is a private contractor contracted to provide 94 houses for the compensation and reallocation of 'refinery affected persons.' With the advocacy work of OBRA 46 houses have quickly been built and are ready for occupation even as the remainder of the project progresses on.

A boycott of Chinese products and services was suggested as a way of keeping Chinese operations in Uganda in check through the Chinese government. The mobilizing of Civil Society resources and networks, and the intended outcome of this strategy were however not too clear.

Social Auditors and audits were suggested to be much needed resources in the public/community monitoring of infrastructural projects. This Community-Based Monitors (CBMs), it was suggested, would form an inclusive multi-stakeholder team comprising of retired civil servants, religious leaders, projects affected communities, opinion leaders, and cultural leaders to mention but a few.

Our respondents also highlighted the need for community focused grievance-handling mechanisms as a strategy in mitigating tensions between communities, Chinese companies and the government. These mechanisms, it was suggested, should be designed such as to be both participatory and inclusive in their engagements.

Our respondents stressed the need to have independent actors involved in addressing community grievances and public audits. Such actors include the likes of National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), District environmental officers, and community development officers.

### **What is the role Civil Society Organizations in China-Uganda exchanges?**

Most respondents appreciated the importance of strengthening synergies, alliances/movements with other local and international CSOs as a way of amplifying their advocacy interventions. Grassroots and community-based organizations are seen as critical actors in such roles as mapping and documenting of social justice cases for advocacy purposes. Local organizations have a role to play in awareness rising about the Chinese developments in the country and how the people need to adjust with the changes. This will help to Bridge gap between local people and Chinese.

Our respondents also stressed the importance of Civil Society lobby advocating for the operationalization of the Ugandan local content policy. For the Bunyoro Region to economically benefit from the presence of Chinese contractors in the sub region, relevant government agency will need to be compelled into implementing some

form of economic 'affirmative action' for local labour recruitment at various project levels, improving of capacities of small and medium sized traders, and investing in quality technical education.

The role of Civil Society actors as agents of transparency and accountability was re-emphasized, especially in addressing rent seeking behaviours.

It was observed that many of our respondents had some form of community paralegal work; this was suggested as a good resource that could be employed for pro bono public litigation processes involving aggrieved communities and Chinese contractors.

### **Challenges CSOs experience while working in the Albertine Graben region**

In addressing challenges faced by CSOs in the Mid-West region, government regulation and laws were identified as key deterrents to their work. With the enactment of the Public Order Management Act , many of our respondents are concerned that there is ardent government effort pushing for the 'shrinking space' for Civil Society actors.

It was further noted that access to relevant information, which should be in the purview of the general public was a big challenge for the work of our respondents. The oil and gas industries are particularly notorious in this regard. This challenge was highlighted in the context of what was termed as a culture of political impunity, patronage and corruption.

Also, with Civil Society in general, through NGOs taking up public causes, there is an unrealistic demands and expectations on them; this is especially the case for 'non-indigenous' actors and organizations that prone to top-down approaches to community development and advocacy.

The solidarity and unity of Civil Society was also highlighted as a factor affecting the impact and efficacy of inclusive development agendas.

Access to financial resources was also highlighted as a big challenge in impactful advocacy work around state initiated and Chinese implemented large-scale projects.

### **Membership and Participation in South-South Cooperation Networks**

20 CSOs out of the 28-targeted respondents were part of the networks doing interventions relating to China's presence and impacts on communities and these networks included Bunyoro Albertine Petroleum Network on Environment and Conservation (BAPENECO) and Bunyoro Coalition on oil and sustainable live hood (BUCOSA). Key of their experiences was that alliances form a good platform for

brainstorming on challenges issues in the society in order to get joint actions/solutions.

28 CSOs were open to the idea of joining a Civil Society coalition/network engaging in the South-South Cooperation discourse in Uganda and in Africa at large. This is with the condition that their network's objectives are aligned with the interest and objectives of the individual organizations.

With such a coalition, our respondents believe that synergies can be built for broadening civic space. This would provide an opportunity for local Civil Society organizations to learn from each other and draw from the strength and traction of regional and international solidarities.

Our respondents suggested the following ways in which their organizations could participate in such a network:

- Information sharing amongst CSOs
- Exposure visits
- Coordination of activities
- Collecting information from grass roots
- Raising issues for advocacy and lobbying
- Sharing of experience with other CSOs
- Mobilizing Communities
- Hosting the network

## 6.4 Discussion of Case Studies

---

### CSOs' CSR Expectations and Dependency

*"I don't see Chinese involvement in social issues like Western organizations and countries..."*

In examining CSOs interactions with Chinese contractors, it emerged that local communities and actors, in especially Tanzania, have certain expectations of investors in their midst. Our study findings suggest that both local communities and CSOs actors feel that Chinese contractors, like other Multinational Corporation (MNCs) familiar to them, are obliged to initiate and implement community development programmes. The implementation of these initiatives is further expected to be collaborative, whereby local actors and leadership plays in some part of it.

Some of our respondents went as far as to express the need for Chinese contractors, again as contrasted to the so called Western actors, need to give

‘programmatic support’ to the local CBOs, NGOs and CSOs. This support is seemingly perceived as a show of goodwill that contractors have fostered with the community.

In trying to make sense of this expectation, we borrow from Jenkins and Obara (2006) commentary on CSR-induced community dependency. Much as Jenkins and Obara highlight the paternalistic model of many CSR initiatives in especially mining and extraction communities. Such models of corporate-community engagement, they proffer, tend not to invest in local social capital, thereby requiring at best ‘outsider management’ and at worst, simply die off with the departure of company.

Cultural differences, as discussed below, and community dependency, in part account for some of the expectations local communities have on Chinese contractors in local development engagements.

### **Racialized Labour Dynamics**

The Chinese were severally accused of conducting questionable labour practices. These practices were broadly articulated in terms of racialized hiring practices, racialized wage/compensation discrimination, and poor labour-regulations observation. A nuanced look at these three further shows a conflation of cultural differences and race relations in the manner in which labour dynamics play out.

In spite of China’s recent rise in global prominence as both an economic and political player, the Chinese society remains to be incredibly conservative and insular. The portrayals of Africa in Chinese media, furthermore, tend to be associated with exotic racialized tropes (Kuo & Huang, 2016). In what Sautman and Hairong (2016) refer to as the ‘racialization of labour’, we therefore see how such tropes colour Chinese contractors’ attitudes towards Africans, and consequently affect racial relations. In a comparative study of Chinese and American labour practices in Kenya, Rounds and Huang (2017) anecdotally speak of Chinese contractors’ resistance in expanding local content in labour on account of African untrustworthiness and unreliability. This study was however unable to in anyway link race a factor in the hiring practices of the Chinese – Rounds and Huang suggest that the Chinese racism in Chinese firms is only a matter of a brash poor grasp of political correctness. Rounds and Huang further query whether Chinese poor reputation could be accounted for by firm characteristics such as size of a firm and industry of operation and not ‘nationality’. They further suggest that the smaller a firm the greater the likelihood of unsophisticated human resources capacity. They additionally posit that some industries are more prone to labour regulations violations than others. They hereby highlight the construction industry – a Chinese niche industry – for its poor labour regulation reputation regardless of nationality of operators. According to Rounds and Huang the construction industry tends to take informal approach to human resource management, which favours casualization of employees.

It has further been suggested that Chinese companies have no experience labour unions and labour rights in their home country China. This has therefore been suggested as a factor contributing to Chinese's supposed low regard to labour rights norms in Africa (Geerts, Xinwa, & Rossouw, 2014).

Other than accounting for the labour dynamics, cultural differences are as well cited in interpersonal conflict between Chinese contractors and African employees. The African philosophy is described as being one of "live and let's live together". This philosophy espouses values of communal living, human relationships, and reciprocity promoting human worth and relationship as contrasted to transactional social exchanges. This is contrasted to Chinese's philosophy of life, which tends to espouse transactional and mutual benefit in exchanges, and centrality of the family in its elaborate honour system. These attributes supposedly account for the paternalistic nature of Chinese management approach. These different worldviews in intercultural communication are therefore suggested to be a major hurdle in fostering meaningful social exchanges between Chinese expatriates and local actors. It is therefore imperative that Chinese businesses have a fairly good grasp of local African cultures as they anticipate setting up shop on the continent (Pierre & Matondo, 2012).

### **The Poor Quality of Chinese Work**

The quality of Chinese work, especially in the construction industry, is often a subject of much criticism in Africa. Geerts, Xinwa and Rossouw (2014) explain that this is as a result of two factors: a cyclic sub-contracting system between Chinese firms, and wide spread corruption in African governments.

According to Geerts, Xinwa and Rossouw, large Chinese firms outsource and subcontract different aspects of their contracts with African governments to smaller Chinese firms. These subcontracted firms are reported to inturn outsource and subcontract their tasks further to much smaller Chinese companies too. In this cyclical subcontracting each subsequent contractor takes a share of the initial contract payment as profit and passes on the project. The firm that ultimately gets the project implements it with only a fraction of what the government paid. Rent seeking and government corruption is additionally cited as a factor contributing to compromised quality of project implementation. Supposedly the Chinese pay as many commissions and royalties as there are government officials involved in the project. It is in this grander scheme of things that Chinese interests and concerns are wholly beholden to government agents and leaders and not the citizens (Geerts et al., 2014).

## 7.0 Conclusion

---

In situating African Civil Society in South-South Cooperation, this study seeks to highlight their perceived roles and perspectives in this seemingly niche thematic area. The study appreciates the conceptual contestations that underpin different perspectives on what Civil Society is and is about. In the context of new participatory and direct approaches to democracy, the contemporary understanding of Civil Society is increasing being challenged to revise its boundaries to either include diverse forms of civil engagement in the publics or question the legitimacy of some forms of 'social collectives and organizations' within the broader fold of the Civil Society community. This study is however less concerned with how 'some Civil Society are more equal than others' than it is concerned with how different sectors of society (as a contrast to state) engage in the South-South Cooperation narrative in Africa.

To this effect, the study highlights the silence and lack of capacity of African Civil Society as a collective in addressing public interests in policy formulation and advocacy. Firstly the study attempts to map and make commentary of African Civil Society knowledge networks that contribute to the Emerging Powers in Africa conversation. The study thereafter surveys the general perceptions of African Civil Society. At this point the study findings show that South-South Civil Society initiative most often than not miss out on the community engagement. This informed by the fact that most of the self-described community based organization hardly have any familiarity or experience in South-South relations spaces. This highlights a grander institutional architecture underpinning these relations, which are inherently designed to be State-to-State or State-to-State affiliated bodies exchanges. It is this context of inaccessible spaces that Civil Society participation in this area is mostly a reserve of development agencies, academia and think tanks, and international NGOs.

The survey also established that many non-state actors design and implement governance related interventions concerning Human Rights, social justice, and democracy. This is contrasted to the evolving development discourse milieu that is mobilizing around the Sustainable Development narrative. In these changing times, it is imperative for African Civil Society to recast their interventions around this narrative if they intend to access and secure the traditional ODA channels. As was attested to by some of our respondents, African Civil Society, in especially governance related work, are finding it harder by the day to secure resources for their work. It was further established by most of our respondents that Civil Society is inadequately represented in South-South Cooperation exchanges.

The grievances and concerns of Civil Society actors from our Albertine and Mwanza case studies highlight the nature of especially Chinese footprint in the region. A survey of Civil Society perceptions at the community was a step in devolving the analysis of South-South Cooperation from bilateral or elitist spaces to the so-called



grassroots. It emerged from these case studies that prevalent and ubiquitous concerns over Chinese operations still remain. These include grievances over labour rights and practices and environmental degradation. Other emergent concerns from the study include intercultural conflicts, information asymmetries in project implementation, and little community participation in project cycle management.

## 8.0 Recommendations

---

Following the finding and analyses of different themes pertaining Civil Society participation in South-South exchanges in Africa, the study therefore makes the following recommendations:

1. There is a great need for the devolution of the South-South cooperation conversation. These are often had only in the elitist domains of Foreign Policy and Economic Policy think tanks and International NGOs. Actors with direct contact with local communities need to participate in this discourse
2. The said actors and communities require to be 'empowered' to meaningfully participate in the development management in the grassroots. The current mode of Civil Society engagement in these communities tends to be paternalistic, whereby local actors and communities play a subservient and dependent role in their interactions with government departments and contractors
3. Regardless of the initiating agent, there is need for investment in participatory mechanisms in development management where affected communities have access to relevant information and part of projects design and implementation
4. At the policy level, there is need for the creation of Civil Society synergies through network and solidarity building for collective Civil Society action in high level platforms of South-South state exchanges
5. Local content concerns should be addressed at policy level and implemented in such a way as to favour project affected communities



## References

---

- ACDP. (2016). About Africa-China Dialogue Platform (ACDP). Retrieved November 14, 2016, from <https://oxfamafricachinadialogueplatform.wordpress.com/about/>
- AERC. (2016). AERC Overview. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://aercafrica.org/index.php/about-aerc/overview>
- Alden, C., Wu, Y., & Plessis, R. du. (2016). China-Africa Factsheet. Johannesburg: SALLA. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-4159.2011.07575.x>
- Brown, L. D., Naidoo, K., & Khagram, S. (2011). Introduction. In L. D. Brown (Ed.), *Practice-Research Engagement and Civil Society in a globalizing world* (pp. 1–8). Cambridge, MA: Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations.
- Bujra, A. (2003). Some Reflections on the Evolution CODESRIA , Critical Social Science, and the African Social Science Community. In *CODESRIA's 30th Anniversary Summit Conference* (pp. 1–39). Senegal: CODESRIA.
- Carayannis, T., & Olin, N. (2012). *A Preliminary Mapping of China-Africa Knowledge Networks*. New York: The Social Science Research Council.
- CCS. (2016). Centre for Chinese Studies. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.ccs.org.za/?cat=17>
- CODESRIA. (2016). Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?rubrique193>
- Cornwall, A., & Brock, K. (2005). What do Buzzwords do for Development Policy ? A critical look at “participation”, “empowerment” and “poverty reduction.” *Third World Quarterly*, 26(7), 1043–1060. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500235603>
- Fahamu Africa. (2016). Emerging Powers in Africa. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from <http://www.fahamu.org/Emerging-Powers-in-Africa>
- Geerts, S., Xinwa, N., & Rossouw, D. (2014). *Africans' perception of Chinese Business in Africa: A Survey*. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004>
- Gelb, A., & Majerowicz, S. (2011). Oil for Uganda – or Ugandans? Can Cash Transfers Prevent the Resource Curse? *SSRN Electronic Journal*, (July 2011). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1910111>
- Guloba, M., Kilimani, N., & Nabiddo, W. (2010). The Impact of China-Africa Aid Relations: The Case of Uganda. *African Economic Research Consortium Policy Brief*, (10).

- HBS China. (2014). China-Africa Civil Society Dialogue. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from <https://cn.boell.org/en/2014/07/23/china-africa-civil-society-dialogue>
- Jenkins, H., & Obara, L. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the mining industry - the risk of community dependency. *Corporate Responsibility Research Conference, Dublin*, (September), 1–23.
- John, L. (2012). Engaging BRICS: Challenges and Opportunities for Civil Society, (XII). Retrieved from <https://www.oxfamindia.org/sites/default/files/Working paper 12.pdf>
- Kuo, L., & Huang, Z. (2016). The story behind the racist Chinese ad where a black man gets his skin color scrubbed off. Retrieved June 22, 2017, from <https://qz.com/693978/the-story-behind-the-racist-chinese-ad-where-a-black-man-gets-his-skin-color-scrubbed-off/>
- Laine, J. (2014). Debating Civil Society: Contested Conceptualizations and Development Trajectories. *International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law*, 16(1), 59–77. Retrieved from <http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol16iss1/debating-civil-society.pdf>
- Lewis, D. (2002). Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept. *Development and Change*, 33(4), 569–586. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00270>
- Li, H. (2015). China House, an initiative to help Chinese in Africa integrate better. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from <http://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/article/1735859/china-house-initiative-help-chinese-africa-integrate-better>
- Liu, Y. (2016). Moving to Africa for fresh air – intriguing “insider” insights into Nairobi’s Chinese community, and what the future holds.
- Naidu, S. (2011). Civil Society in Africa: Perspectives on the Expanding Engagement with Southern Partners. In R. Modi (Ed.), *South-South Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage* (pp. 203–219). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ntambirweki, B., & Barungi, J. (2016). China-Africa Relations: Mutual Benefits for Africa and China. Kampala: ACODE.
- Obwona, M., Guloba, M., Nabiddo, W., & Kilimani, N. (2007). China-Africa economic relations: The case of Uganda, AERC Scoping Studies on China-Africa Economic Relations, 1–41.
- Oxfam. (2016a). Improving Global Governance through engagement with Civil Society: The case of BRICS. Oxfam GB. Retrieved from <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/improving-global-governance-through->

engagement-civil-society-case-brics

- Oxfam. (2016b). Who We Are. Retrieved November 14, 2016, from <https://www.oxfam.org/en/about>
- Pierre, J., & Matondo, M. (2012). Cross-Cultural Values Comparison between Chinese and Sub-Saharan Africans. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 3(11), 38–46. Retrieved from [http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol\\_3\\_No\\_11\\_June\\_2012/5.pdf](http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_11_June_2012/5.pdf)
- Poskitt, A., Shankland, A., & Taela, K. (2016). Civil Society from the BRICS: Emerging Roles in the New International Development Landscape. *IDS Evidence Report*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Rounds, Z., & Huang, H. (2017). *We are not so different : A comparative study of employment relations at Chinese and American firms in Kenya* (SAIS-CARI Working Paper Series). Washington, DC. Retrieved from <http://www.sais-cari.org/publications>.
- SACE. (2016). About the Foundation. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.sacefoundation.org/about/>
- SAIIA. (2016). SAIIA China-Africa Toolkit: An information portal. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://www.saiia.org.za/>
- Sautman, B., & Hairong, Y. (2016). The discourse of racialization of labour and Chinese enterprises in Africa. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 39(12), 2149–2168. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1139156>
- Sen, A. (2000). *Development as Freedom*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- Shivji, I. G. (2007). *Silences in NGO discourse*. (F. Manji, Ed.). Oxford, Nairobi: Pambazuk.
- UNESCO. (2009). Civil Society in Africa: Definition and role in the process of the African Union programme - NEPAD. UNESCO. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0025>
- Vaes, S., & Huyse, H. (2013). New voices on south-south cooperation between emerging powers and Africa: African Civil Society perspectives. Leuven: HIVA Research Institute for Work and Society.
- Wits Journalism. (2016). Wits Africa-China Reporting Project. Retrieved November 11, 2016, from <http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/about/>
- Wnuk-Lipinski, E., & Bukowska, X. (2011). Civil Society. In B. Badie (Ed.), *International encyclopedia of political science* (pp. 259–264). California, London, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications.