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Violence, Militarised Masculinity and Positive Peace

Kopano Ratele

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6: Violence, Militarised Masculinity, Positive Peace

Kopano Ratele

Introduction

This paper is about militarised masculinity and its relationship to violence and peace. One of its objectives is to surface how this form of masculinity fundamentally troubles the making of durable peace in 'post-conflict' Africa, how, for instance, it makes the 'post' in post-conflict never past and unproblematic.

At the outset, important to underline is that militarised masculinity is non-identical with men in the military, and can be found also in daily life outside of militaries, armed guerrilla and liberation groups, terrorist networks, rebel movements, or other armed groupings. To attempt a working definition, the concept 'militarised – or war-like – masculinity', is used here to refer to a set of ideologically informed practices that normalise violence and conflict, and more specifically armed conflict – ideologies and practices ultimately employable in battles for primarily supra-individual power (Cock 1989, Langa & Eagle 2008, Lopes 2011, Mankanyi 2006, Whitworth 2005). At heart, militarised masculinity is the embodiment of the threat and use of violence that undergirds gender and sexuality of men's socioeconomic power.

Seeking to make clear the connections between violence, militarised masculinity and the making of positive peace, the paper discusses the imperative, and possibilities, of moving away from this form of gender and sexual power and its ideals if African countries that are experiencing, or that have supposedly emerged from, conflict or oppressive systems are to build resilient forms of peace. Militarised masculinity, being central to discourses of military capability and superiority, is privileged – at times explicitly, but more often implicitly – within discussions on peace in Africa; privilege observable mainly in the discourse of international peace and security; privilege which, therefore, produces warrior-like gender and sexual 'performances', identities, relations and attitudes. Thus this paper argues for putting the transformation of men's gender and sexual practices at the centre of thinking about peace. The argument is premised on the thesis that there is an association between men's violence against women and other men in 'post-conflict' and conflict settings, on the one hand, and an imperialist, militarised model of sexuality and gender that structures dominant forms of masculinities, on the other. Even though the place of honour given to military capability is not difficult to note in reports of international and national security, this association of men's violence in conflict and post-conflict situations to models of masculinity appears to be largely ignored in discussion of peace, including in many discussions of rape in and as war.

That said, since I am writing from a country that is not commonly regarded as in armed conflict (namely South Africa), a society that international reports defines as at peace even while the body count points to the gaps in understanding the meaning of peace (and conflict), the argument here cannot focus on peace

operations in (post)conflict environments only. Peace practice, research and theory in Africa must also be focused on redefining our understanding of post-conflict peacebuilding, even while seeking to change war-like masculinities in violence-soaked societies into positively peaceful ones. Cautioning against a view of African manhood as a product outside of the time and place in which it exists, the paper is also intended to contribute towards an appreciation of the connections between the socioeconomic conditions in which African men exist and the traumatic histories that sculpt masculinities in Africa and which propel or seduce men to employ, actively support or be complicit with violence against women and other men in their society.

It needs noting that this paper is located not at the level of the ongoing international efforts on the importance of gender in peacekeeping and peacebuilding intervention led by multilateral organisations such as the UN, Southern African Development Community (SADC), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and African Union (AU). While these bodies undoubtedly shape global, continental, regional and local ideas about peace and hence cannot but be referenced, the argument here seeks to resituate the work of civil society, particularly the work of gender scholars and activists, at the centre of doing peace.

The first section of the paper dwells on violence. Here I draw out the complex, long-drawn out, and costly nature of violent conflicts as a defining element of Africa. I describe the continuities between colonial and post-colonial violence; between violence during wartime and post-conflict; between collective and interpersonal violence; and more generally between war and peace. One of the difficulties faced in thinking about peace in Africa is that distinguishing war from peace is not a simple matter, and therefore I signal the intention to rethink the ends of peacebuilding from a local, insider perspective.

Next the paper turns to masculinities. In this section I show the imbrication of violence in the making of ruling masculinity. I argue for moving beyond the rhetoric of including women as a group and a gender perspective and tackle the culture of martial masculinity. I also include here a brief discussion about non-militaristic, non-violent, and/or non-sexist, African masculinities.
The last section highlights new forms of peace and engaging non-violent and other alternative forms of African masculinities. I offer a definition and discussion of these new forms and their possibilities for peace.

Violence

> The concept of peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of harmony achieved by the absence of war or conflict. Applied to nations, this would suggest that those not involved in violent conflicts with neighbouring states or suffering internal wars would have achieved a state of peace. This is what Johan Galtung defined as a 'negative peace' – an absence of violence. The concept of negative peace is immediately intuitive and empirically measurable, and can be used as a starting point to elaborate its

> counterpart concept, 'positive peace'. (Institute for Economics and Peace 2011: 5)

The story of violence in Africa has been told many a time. Instead of tilling over the same ground again I have opted to indicate some of the largely overlooked obstacles in the way to achieving widespread, durable and positive peace. Direct violence is one of the main problems facing several African countries, obviously. However, the ending of direct violence by itself will not make a country more just, happy or rich. Peace defined as an absence of direct violence is insufficient, only a step towards positive peace. What is needed is peace that enables development. What is needed is, ultimately, peace with socioeconomic justice – that is peace that is intolerant of socioeconomic injustice; and more specifically, peace characterised by sexual and gender justice for women and men as subjects of socioeconomic power.

While differing with him on the definition of feminist justice, I concur with Sterba (1994: 184) that the achievement of lasting peace is centrally connected to the achievement of gender justice 'so that those who oppose violence in international arenas must, in consistency, oppose violence against women as well'. And with regard to socioeconomic justice, where peace gets 'associated with the problem of security but (also) used as a defence of certain security plans and rationalities', as Ilcan and Phillips (2006: 60) have contended, 'peace as a social justice issue concerned with resolving the problems of poverty, unequal access to resources, and social conflicts undergirding the global economy remains marginal'. In this view, sustainable peace remains elusive for many parts of Africa because it is usually decoupled from development and socioeconomic justice. In those countries currently regarded as peaceful – for example, Djibouti, Chad, Benin and Angola – the barrenness of the peace for the majority of the people, because of either the nature of governance or socioeconomic underdevelopment, is revelatory. At the bottom of the elusiveness and emptiness of peace is then the fact that, perhaps more than other continents, violence in its bodily, structural, and symbolic forms founds and, rather paradoxically, sustains Africa as a geopolitical entity. I mean by this that if structural violence is said to be 'built into the very origins of the United States' (Schwebel 2011: 86), inequality, oppression and suffering shape post-colonial Africa.

Part of the violence that haunts Africa today of course arises from the aggression of internal belligerents battling for power as well from conflicts about resources. However, from the moment of imperial 'discoveries' of the black world and colonial aggression against its people to the present, violence became unexceptional in many places in Africa. And so while at times visible and direct, violence is rarely absent, only invisible and indirect. In 'post-conflict' places like Botswana and South Africa it might not be as direct and immediate as it is in places like Somalia and Sudan but for women, men, girls, and boys at the receiving end of non-direct structural violence, it is no doubt as real as any form of direct violence. There are literally thousands of stories we can adduce to show the effects of non-direct violence – about hunger, lack of shelter, inadequate health provision, lack of access to water and sanitation, and no education, but these are quite familiar and can be read in many daily African newspapers.[1] In a country said to be at peace such as South Africa, sexual and gender violence

against women, hunger, high levels of morbidity and child mortality from lack of access to adequate health services, and so forth, suggest that the absence of direct armed conflict seriously challenges the adequacy of the prevailing understanding of peace (as they do notions of economic development). And in the case of Botswana, what is of interest for peace researchers is that although for the last three years the country has been rated by the Global Peace Index as the most peaceful in Africa (IEP 2011: 5), the relatively high levels of premature mortality – which is suggestive of indirect forms of violence – among young Batswana women and men prompts critical questions about the meaningfulness of peace for ordinary citizens.

How can we speak of meaningful peace, then, when those in power in African countries, through omission, commission or indifference, let those they rule over die from preventable causes? What is the meaning of peace in such cases? As noted already, meaningful peace cannot be thought of without regard to gendered socioeconomic justice. Even when there might be no regular wars, in the context of overt and devious aggression by governments against their peoples, perturbing levels and gratuitousness of interpersonal lethal violence, non-fatal grievous physical violence, sexual violence, as well as other forms of interpersonal, symbolic and structural violence, talk of peace is almost meaningless.

In arguing for a distinction between negative peace – absence of personal, armed violence – and the positive form of peace – absence of structural violence – Galtung contended that:

> the absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition, whereas the absence of structural is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition (egalitarian distribution of power and resources). Thus, peace conceived this way is not only a matter of control and reduction of the overt use of violence, but of ... vertical development. (Galtung1969: 183)

Yet, it is important in working on peace as socioeconomic justice to go beyond the redistribution of goods and material resources, but also consider the politics of recognition (Fraser 1996). This applies particularly in struggles around identity, such as those on gender and sexuality, but also of course of disability, culture, race and others.

Some of the institutionalised, representational and bodily violence that characterises Africa is without doubt a legacy of the continent's violent colonial histories, anti-colonial liberation struggles, and cold war sponsored by former colonies and interested parties. Imperialism, slavery and colonialism were not peace projects. These were aggressive processes aimed at subjugating the native peoples and exploiting their land, labour and other resources. The effects of that encounter reverberate to this day. As Peacock has said, 'our work to end men's violence against each other, and against women, also has to address other forms of oppression, including racism and the legacy of colonialism' (2012: 1). The implication of Africa's legacy is that 'post-conflict' peace is that much harder to build here than elsewhere. When a nation or continent, in addition to

imperialism, slavery and colonialism, has experienced long or repeated cycles of violence and thus cannot be regarded as 'truly post-conflict' (World Bank 2011: 4), it appears that positive peace is more elusive to build and maintain. Colonial histories and the rich nations' contemporary, competing interests in Africa's resources provide one set of keys to understanding why violence has affected Africa more than any other continent. These old and present-day interests also point to why there are challenges to credible, inclusive and lasting peace. By 'affected more' it is meant that African conflicts have tended to last longer, are deadlier, can involve multiple adversaries at once, and are socially and economically costlier than in other regions (ADB 2008). Relatively recent examples of the influence of former colonial powers and superpowers on African conflicts

> include western support for the kleptocratic Mobutu regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and support by the former Soviet Union and the West for the MPLA government and UNITA rebel movement, respectively, in Angola in the 1980s. The former Soviet Union also actively supported the Derg regime in Ethiopia, sending troops to repulse an invasion by Somalia in the Ogaden War of 1977–78. The repressive Barre regime in Somalia received support from the former Soviet Union and later from the West when it shifted allegiance. (ADB 2008: 7)

Highlighting the same point of the length of African conflicts, Jourdan says:

> a variable that we have to consider carefully while speaking of African conflicts is the long duration of wars. In many regions, such as East Congo, war has lost its character of being an exception; it has become the norm pervading everyday life. It therefore becomes nearly impossible for combatants to formulate an ideological or political explanation of their status which could provide them with a justification for their actions. In this situation, violence seems to become self-validating: killings and destruction motivated by the simple desire for personal revenge, pillaging of villages carried out to satisfy the greed for goods, rape motivated by a momentary desire to possess a woman, and so on. (Jourdan 2011: 100)

There are several other such conflicts. Some of the cases are bloodier than others. Many involve more than just a single bone of contention. Most are complicated by the involvement of more than just two antagonists. And because of weakened institutions and historical legacies, external parties with their own agendas easily enter and become part of the picture of violence.
The report of the UN secretary-general on 'The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa' mentioned historical legacies, internal factors, external factors, economic motives and particular situations as important and common sources of conflicts in Africa (UN 1998). The report of the AU-UN panel on peacekeeping operations observed that 'it is in Africa that [conflict] is felt most acutely. It is also in Africa that the number and scale of the issues mean that they do not necessarily attract the attention that they deserve' (UN 2008a: 2).

A symptomatic case of the duration, complexity and costs of an African violent conflict, beginning in 1995 in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, is the conflict in and around the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At one time or another the conflict involved armies of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, who offered support to the government of Laurent Kabila, against various anti-government armed groups, who received support from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. Rwanda itself cannot be treated as a footnote (Gourevitch 1995, Power 2001). The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is, in fact, one of the definitive moments of the violence that characterise African history, reinforcing Africa's relationship to the world powers and multilateral organisations and global instruments of peacekeeping. Such a moment could only but define the relationship of men to women and other men in that country, and hence it is moment that needed to be reckoned with in post-conflict peacebuilding, reconstruction and reconciliation. Genocide, violent conflicts and long (on and off) struggles in and of Rwanda, DRC, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Africa and most of Africa have thus not only defined those countries, but also define the prevailing models of masculinity to be found in them. Naturally, this is a general hypothesis that can only tested through empirical study in each of the particular locations, but in light of available research it appears to hold promise to deepen our understanding about peace, violence and masculinity.

For example, the 2008/2009 report of the ADB (2008), which was focused on conflict resolution, peace and reconstruction, points out that out of 6.6 million battle deaths recorded in state-based armed conflicts globally in the 45 years up to 2005, approximately one in every four battle deaths were recorded in Africa. Elaborating on the burden of violence on Africa the 2008 report of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations notes that:

> since 1948 there have been 63 United Nations peacekeeping missions, almost half of them in Africa. African troops have been involved in all but 10 of these. Currently, peacekeepers in Africa make up nearly 75 per cent of United Nations peacekeepers deployed worldwide, and of these, 40 per cent are drawn from African troop contributors. The 2008 budget for United Nations operations deployed on the African continent amounts to $5.162 billion. (UN 2008b: 9)

In the same report, which references other research, it is noted that 'men aged 15–29 are most likely to be killed, but women make up nearly a quarter of all battle deaths. Estimates also suggest that battle deaths are almost equally split between military and civilian fatalities' (ADB 2008: 11). In war, the majority of casualties are young men because the majority of combatants are young men, but a significant number of women die because of armed conflict. The distribution and patterns of mortality during war and civil conflict are of particular interest in that they mirror those during peacetime, suggesting the gaps in our thinking about the meanings and engagement of peace and conflict. In a country not at war, South Africa, the high levels of homicide present a picture that challenges generally accepted ideas about war and peace. Similarly to wartime, rates of homicide in South Africa are highest among young men between ages 15 and 29 (184 per 100,000) and the male-female ratio for homicide is 7:1 (Seedat et al 2009). Among males in general, the highest

homicide rates are observed among older teenage and young adult African males in poor and low-income neighbourhoods within urban areas (Ratele and Suffla 2010). Most worrying is that the highest rates within the city of Cape Town (the third largest city in South Africa and one where the population of Africans is lower than in all other major cities) were seen among African males aged between 20 and 24 (501,6 per 100,000) (Ratele and Suffla 2010, Ratele, Smith, van Niekerk & Seedat, 2011). The rates of violence-related death of young African men are much higher than seen in many wars. Note that these figures, although higher than in most countries, are reflective of the widely known finding that globally homicide victimisation and perpetration rates among males are higher than rates among females (Krug et al 2002).
The point of all the above is that young African males tend to die at higher rates than females and males of other races. Ultimately, though, how all of these numbers should be apprehended is that the violent death of young men is not confined to times of war but is, rather, a constant possibility in the lives of young, poor, African men.

Fatalities are not the only consequence of war and violent conflicts. As the ADB succinctly puts it, 'wars affect peoples' lives long after the fighting has stopped' (2008: 12). In the aftermath of war there are elevated numbers of people with disability or disease; relatively more rapid spread of epidemics; large numbers of people displaced; reduced social cohesion; weakened relationships; and higher levels of trauma. Of particular interest here is gender-based violence, and specifically sexual violence, which has received increased attention as a weapon of violent conflict. A number of organisations and researchers have reported that in the last few decades rape and sexual violence have become systematic war instruments (e.g. UN 2008c, UN 2012, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2009). Researchers have also argued that:

> sexual violence is not simply a consequence of conflict; it also helps to maintain and prolong conflict. The deeply intimate nature of the violence affects not only the women violated, but also weakens and destroys community bonds. Sexual violence provokes tension within and between communities and leaves behind long lasting fear and suspicion. The particular nature of the violence prolongs conflict, complicates the peace process and makes reconciliation work even more difficult. (Dymond n.d.: 5)

The use of sexual violence in war and conflict has become a serious enough problem to warrant the appointment of a special representative on sexual violence in conflict by the United Nations (UN) secretary-general. Preceding that more recent development, Resolution 1820 was adopted by the UN Security Council in June 2008. In adopting the resolution the UN noted:

> that civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group; and that sexual violence perpetrated in this manner may in some instances persist after the cessation of hostilities. (UN 2008c: 1–2)

Furthermore, the resolution notes that:

> rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide, stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes, and calls upon Member States to comply with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law and equal access to justice, and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation. (UN 2008c: 3)

In regard to the conflict in and around the DRC referred to above, over and above an estimated 5 million people who have lost their lives through the direct and indirect consequences of the conflict that started in 1994, extreme levels of rape and sexual violence have been reported. In respect of the sexual violation of women and girls in the DRC conflict, the rapists ridiculed the male family members of the women and girls as 'failures and undermined the social cohesion of their respective enemies. Many young men were coerced into violence against their own family members and then forcibly recruited. This made it almost impossible for them to return to their family of origin' (GTZ 2009: 4). The Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (SCIAF) (Dymond n.d.) observed that the frequency and cruelty of sexual violence in DRC was unprecedented, 'accompanied by unimaginable brutality against women and girls'. A small percentage of sexual violence was directed at boys and men. SCIAF estimated an 'average of 45 rapes reported a day' in the province of South Kivu in the eastern region of the DRC (Dymond n.d.: 3). In the report regarding the mission to the DRC, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) special rapporteur on violence against women observed that:

> sexual violence has been a defining feature of the Congolese armed conflicts. Extreme levels of sexual violence, perpetrated by non-State armed groups, State security forces and civilians persist in those areas of Eastern Congo that are still experiencing hostilities. However, sexual violence is not restricted to zones of armed conflict; it is rampant in the whole country. (UNHRC 2008: 6)

The UNHRC report on the DRC mission argued that the sexual atrocities were aimed 'at the complete physical and psychological destruction of women with implications for the entire society' (UNHRC 2008: 2). The report further noted that PNC and FARDC employed mass rape and other forms of sexual violence in systematic retaliation against the civilians; impunity for rape was common and widespread; women survivors of rape suffered severe physical and psychological injuries; there was inadequate care for survivors who were often rejected and stigmatised by their families and the justice system; sexual violence had eroded the usual social mechanisms inhibitive of extreme forms of violence, triggering the exercise of cruel fantasies by men on women's bodies; and that not only armed groups but civilians too perpetrated rape, adding yet another layer of violent oppression for women.

More recently, between 30 July and 2 August 2010, mass rapes were reported from North Kivu's Walikale region. Reports stated that 200 to 400 armed men belonging to the rebel Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Mai Mai tribal militia went into a number of villages and hundreds of women were raped. Due to the underreporting of rape, there are likely to have been more victims than the approximately 300 known cases (UN 2012).
A focus on sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations helps us in better understanding and rethinking what peace means and what is meaningful peace from a gendered, local, insider perspective. It is also of consequence because, as the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations aver, rape in conflict has been at once one of history's greatest silences and, till recently, rarely condemned in mentions of war crimes.

Its impact is exacerbated by social and religious taboos, including a cultural disinclination to disclose abuse. Shrouded in shame, it is a torture tactic that victims are reticent to reveal. It is precisely this stigma and silence, which supports impunity for the perpetrators, that has contributed to its prevalence as a war tactic of choice. Indeed, sexual violence challenges conventional notions of what constitutes a security threat. It is often invisible: the world does not witness rape in the same way as landmine injuries. Cheaper than bullets, it requires no weapons system other than physical intimidation, making it low cost, yet high impact. This may also render sexual violence resistant to disarmament processes and ceasefire monitoring, which aim to rid communities of conventional weapons and ensure the cessation of shooting and other openly hostile acts (UNIFEM and DPKO 2010: 12).

A recent study of sexual violence in the DRC concludes that rape and intimate partner sexual violence in the country is much higher than previously reported (Peterman at al 2011: 1063, 1064). The study estimates that between 1.69 and 1.80 million Congolese women aged 15 to 49 had been raped, with between 407,397 and 433,785 women reporting having been raped in the preceding 12 months, and approximately 3.07 to 3.37 million women reporting experiencing intimate partner sexual violence. A study conducted in northern Uganda found that women living in camps for internally displaced persons faced high levels of violence. Three of every 10 women were said to 'have experienced forced sex with husbands (or other intimate partner) against their wishes; and approximately 1 of 20 women has been raped by someone outside of the household' (Stark et al 2010: 1060).

However, it is well known that sexual and gender violence in peacetime was also once one of the world's public secrets, not only because the meaning of peace itself needs problematisation, but more crucially insofar as sexual and gender violence is normalised. At risk of exaggerating, there is no peacetime for many women in many countries. A war without regular guns and knives – but many with these and other weapons – goes on in daily life in countries such as those mentioned above and many others. Among other problems, this war against women can and manages to go on unremarked because it is made invisible by the fact that the legal definition of rape and sexual offences differs from country

to country, rendering some coercive sexual acts normative. Indeed, in some countries the concept of marital rape is not criminalised and sexual violence against a wife by her husband unimaginable. Thus police investigation and prosecution of sexual violence cases may be less enthusiastic than that of robbery and murder(Frieze 1983, Sampson 2010, Shannon et al 2012). Feminist thinkers have therefore strongly cautioned against perceiving sexual violence in conflict situations 'as a stand alone social problem that arises wholly because of the conflict situation and will naturally die down when peace is restored' (Ayiera 2010: 14). In thinking about sexual and other forms of violence against women, it is clear that sexual aggression against women in peacetime is closely connected to violence against women's bodies in wartime. One is the extension of the other. Both are indicative of the prevalent form of sexual, gendered relations and masculinity ideologies in society. It is problematic, therefore, to isolate sexual violence in times of armed conflict from the continuum within which men's violence against women and other men becomes part of the wider culture. Thus, the high profile prosecution of perpetrators or instigators of sexual violence during conflict by bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a necessary but inadequate response. The fact that large scale rape took place while high-ranking rebel commanders were being prosecuted by the ICC is clear indication of prosecutions as insufficient deterrent but also of violence as a significant aspect of men's gender power over women in peacetime (Ayiera 2010). 'Sexualised violence,' as Peacock contends:

> needs to be seen on a continuum of power abuse. Sexualised violence is the same in its intent, and often in its lasting effects, whether it is used in conflict settings or not. Whether in war or peacetime, the perpetration of sexualised violence is driven by socially sanctioned male dominance over women – and over socially weaker men, and children – by notions of manhood and power that valorise sexual conquest and give powerful men a sense of entitlement with no consequences, as many male politicians have shown us. (Peacock 2012: 6)

This continuum of violence that blurs the distinction between war and peace is highlighted by Seedat and colleagues (2009). They report that in South Africa tens of thousands of rapes of women and girls are reported to the police each year, and that the reported numbers may be much lower than the real numbers. Actually, the most recent police report on crime in that country shows even higher reports on sexual offences, although the new definition of rape would have had an impact on the numbers (SAPS 2011). In any event, these rates are among the highest in the world, inclusive of countries in conflict (see also Human Rights Watch 1995).

Similarly to other 'post-conflict' countries, South Africa continues to be bedevilled by high levels of men's violence against women, specifically sexual violence. While there appears to be some agreement about some of the factors causing violence, what remains challenging is how to think of such a country as far as the distinction between violence and peace is concerned. In other words, what is the meaning of peace if such a large number of women experience sexual and other forms of violence in their families and communities?

Violence and masculinities

Ideological belief in and support of militarism and war-like masculine power informs most international peace frameworks. Such belief and support render fighting, wars and soldiers almost inevitable. These are not, to be sure, beliefs held by individual men. They are social or cultural ideologies. They pervade society and culture. They underpin how social groups and institutions within countries interact with each other and shape individuals, as well as how countries interact with one another. They characterise international frameworks and institutions. They are fleshed out in positions and agreements such as the UN Charter (UN 1945), the UN's 'An Agenda for Peace' (UN 1992), and the report of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations (UN 2008a). The AU-UN panel, for instance, considers military capability and force as an integral component of potential solutions to peace. Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter on 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression' reserves and effectively privileges the right to military action to restore peace. Part of article 43 states that:

> All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. (UN 1945: unpaginated)

It is striking how a document such as 'An Agenda for Peace' falls back to, even champions, armed violence in maintaining peace. It states:

> It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression'. ... Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security. ... The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order. (UN 1992: unpaginated).

Whatever the historical significance of these documents in thinking about peace, the way they are married to the idea of achieving peace through violent means is troubling. The privileging of armed aggression is conveyed in other documents of the UN, AU and other international bodies as well. The conception of peace in such documents is compromised by an overt militaristic approach to peace. Of

course the documents speak about diplomacy and economic sanctions and other means of communication, but military action is implicitly, and quite often, explicitly, regarded as a core element of arriving at peace.
Why are military power and action privileged? It is a feminist commonplace that the military and militarism is masculine terrain. The 'forces' make boys into men. 'The twenty million members of the world's armed forces are overwhelmingly men', wrote Connell (2009: 1). 'In many countries all soldiers are men; and even in those countries which admit women to the military, commanders are almost exclusively men.' Cock, however, writing about militarism under white rule in South Africa, contended that the connection between masculinity and militarism 'is a connection by women; they socialise men into a particular definition of masculinity that is violent. Mothers do so from an early age through the provision of war toys and the censure of emotional expression. The army then carries this process to the extreme' (Cock 1989: 55).
Particularly in endless wars, the military is able to implant a deep masculine culture of violence (Pillay 2000). Ultimately, military culture amplifies or reinforces martial practices and attitudes as well as, Mankanyi (2006, 2008) has noted, facilitating risky practices. Whitworth (2005) has pointed to the dilemma of using soldiers for peace. In such conditions, peacebuilding without extirpating the violence, sexuality, risk and associated discourses that form the prevalent form of militarisation of masculinity is unlikely to take us far. Especially when confronted by warriors without a war, building positive peace requires dealing with the making of masculinities.

The military and militarism are not only a terrain on which men are made into men. They are also sites that legitimate and allow men the freedom to employ violence against others. Thus we come to realise that violence constitutes a global dominantidea of manhood. Consequently, while the implication of men's gender practices or masculinity in violent aggression is well established by many studies, it is vital for the sake of peace that militarism and its attendant masculinity receive our full attention as endangering societal peace and development. The privileges of the military and the encouragement of militarism must be confronted because they normalise, sponsor and reproduce a particular form of masculinity as well as the possibility of violent conflict. Violent conflict, especially in the context of where it finds reinforcement such as in militaries, paramilitaries, rebel movements, gangs, and other organised forms plays a productive (as opposed to only instrumental) part in the lives of boys and men in (post)conflict and war zones. This productivity of violent conflicts includes influencing how men and masculinities are imagined and represented in the mind. Amina Mama (1998: 4), talking of the dictatorial Nigerian military regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha, said that 'in the thinking of ordinary Nigerians, the military man exemplifies the masculine ideal'. Especially in conditions where a group of men come to manhood in states of long drawn-out violent conflict, and when 'warriors' cannot formulate an ideologically reasonable political justification to explain their actions, violence becomes part of the mechanism to validate identity, to make men and to form an 'ideology' of masculinity. That is to say, violence, like steroids, becomes a resource for producing a (perception of war-like, militarised) masculine stereotype.
The role of violence in the production of masculinity is not confined to conflict

and war situations. Whenever economic, political and cultural conditions are not conducive of experimentation with different models of manhood or masculine identities, violence becomes a fast vehicle to 'successful' manhood. Success in this instance gets entangled with the willingness to inflict pain or kill others as well as the ability to withstand pain or show no fear for death. As such, in gender training and transformation work with men and boys – and not only in situations of violent conflict – it is imperative to pay attention to the economic, political and cultural conditions in which boys become men and men become violent (Ratele 2008a).

Masculinities play a role in men's violence against women and girls as well as against other men and boys. In contrast to the issues around (women's and girls') gender and sexuality which have been incorporated into thinking about peace and peacebuilding by multilateral organisations, the gender and sexual practices of men and boys that contribute to conflict and need consideration in peacebuilding have not received much attention. What is at issue then is that many a conception of peace and peacebuilding do not take sufficient account of the gendered and sexual histories – global and local, influential and marginal, females' and males' – of the violence that shapes Africa. In addition to the omission of (men's and boy's) gender and sexuality, even while acknowledging women's and girls' vulnerabilities and needs, many definitions of peacebuilding thus neglect to consider how violence gets woven into the making of ruling masculinities. Above all, even though some international bodies like the UN and governments such as France and the United States working to bring peace to Africa do pay attention to issues of gender and sexuality, the culture of military power is glossed over. This culture of militarism is evidenced by government expenditure on arms, defence, security and related military hard- and soft-ware.

Violence has then not only shaped African men's lives, but also how 'African masculinity' is discussed in studies, media and daily life. The majority of studies and media representations tend to uncritically centre violence in researching African men and 'masculinity'. African masculinity has come to mean to think an unchanging, single, violent masculinity (e.g. Barker and Ricardo 2005, Jewkes et al 2006, Koenig et al 2003, Mookodi 2004). A number of studies conducted on violence against women in conflict, post-conflict and 'non-conflict' settings support this contention, reporting high levels of physical and sexual violence by men against intimate partners and strangers as well as widespread acceptance of the use of violence (e.g. Amowitz et al 2002, Swiss et al 1998). Isolating violence against African women in conflict or post-conflict settings from violence in 'normal' conditions, at the risk of repetition, will miss a crucial aspect about violence against women. The UNHRC (2008: 2) has observed that 'if the sexual violence associated with war is addressed in isolation, gender-based discrimination and violence endured by women in "peace" will be grossly neglected and the war on women reinforced'. Men's violence against women and their bodies is not confined to clear conflict situations. This violence continues when the armies have disarmed and demobilised. As such, the meaning of peace from the perspective of sex/gender is different from that in a mainstream, non-feminist political-economy view. The need to look at sexual violence in a broader perspective is attested to by a number of studies from different African countries

(Dunkle 2004, Koenig et al 2003, Reza et al 2007, Uthman et al 2009).
It is not untrue that in many countries sexual violence is more prevalent than is reported, that, indeed, sexual violence has become banal, built into the sexual system. However, it is critical that we avoid a representation from these studies of African men and masculinities as naturally violent. What tends to be occluded from view from these studies is that, first, different forms of African masculinities exist; second, violence in different forms affects both women and men; third, greater numbers of boys and men than girls and women are victims of physical violence; and fourth, there is worrying lack of attention and underreporting of men's sexual violence against boys and other men . While it is known that not all males use violence, the literature on men and boys in Africa can make it difficult to believe that African masculinity is not identical with violent masculinity.

This in no way denies the scourge of violence against women and girls. There is also evidence to support the view that the way that masculinities are formed is linked to violence both against women and girls as well as against other men (e.g. Barker and Ricardo 2005, Breckenridge 1998). The violence of men against women and other men and the militarisation of masculinities have had a central role in colonisation, armed revolutions and insurrection, democratic uprisings, civil wars and in upholding repressive regimes in many countries (Dolan 2002) and, as such, in the making of a dominant form of African masculinities. It is also true that in the contestation of masculinities going on all the time in the world of men, one route for a man to attain successful masculinity is to demonstrate dominance over women, children and other men (Ratele 2008b). This route towards successful masculinity is even clearer in armed conflict. In times of violent conflict, men and boys have to engage in certain activities, including killing, raping, looting, pillaging and showing fearlessness in order to demonstrate their status not just as soldiers but as being fearlessly masculine. Leading to the last section, it becomes ever more clear that the difficulty faced in building and entrenching lasting and credible peace arises from the:

> exclusionary, male-dominated systems of power that allow men, no matter their class, race or creed, to trivialise and normalise their own and other men's violence against women, other men, and children, to laugh it off, including through verbal violence, and to treat it as a private matter without fear of serious sanction from either the state or their friends. If we consider how easy it is for all these social norms and failed institutions to facilitate violence in communities that are not actually at war, then we can begin to see why it is so much more exaggerated in situations of armed conflict. (Peacock 2012: 7)

The challenge for (pro)feminist African scholars and activists of peace is plain, but not uncomplicated. Beyond the fact that peace cannot but be seen as composed by more than the cessation of hostilities, it seems that the complexity of the task for African scholars and activists arises from the fact that building durable, positive peace requires including those who tend to be excluded from peace negotiations within the frameworks drawn by global and national militaristic orders. It seems that in order to build a socioeconomic justice that is oriented towards peace, it is necessary to undo the gendered sexual and

economic power of militarism and war-like masculinity. This is no doubt a hard task. And yet if it is to endure, peace must be built from a grounded, local perspective – where local means those who are at the receiving end of violence as it manifests itself, including girls and women. Peace that glosses over gendered and racialised historical social injustice and underdevelopment will continually be imperilled. Is it, then, really possible to circumvent the power of militarism and war-like masculinity?

Towards peace by engaging non-militaristic masculinities

There are a number of ideas gleaned from critical studies of men and masculinities that offer hope and evidence that positive, non-militarised gendered and sexual peace is achievable and men are transformable. These ideas are derived from the concept of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan et al 1985, Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). The concept is employed to refer to those things that allow men's power over women and other men to continue. In other words, hegemonic masculinity is a set of practices productive of unequal gender relations between females and males as groups. discernable from forms of men's gender practices in terms of cultural currency, hegemonic masculinity refers to the normative pattern of practices that define and regulate men as men while at the same time granting them power over women and some men power over other men. The possibility offered by the concept is that, although it is clear that men as a group are bound together by gender and sexual domination over women and 'othered' men, it lifts up the critical differences between masculinities that need to be acknowledged and worked with (Morrell 1998). A crucial insight offered by hegemonic masculinity, and critical studies of men and masculinities more generally, is therefore an understanding of the world of men as being made up of heterogeneous subjects. While it seems obvious to critical scholars of men and masculinities, it seems necessary to keep reiterating the fact that men are not all the same, and that no man is the same all of the time (Whitehead 2006). That is, even when the picture shows high levels of men's violence against women, masculinities can be changed. It is an important point that needs to be underlined within gender and sexuality training and the efforts to work with African men for peace. The fact that there are different sorts of men in Africa, not only violent or militaristic masculinities but men with different desires and relations to discourses of masculinity, needs to be, once more, a central module in gender training and transformation. The larger the assortment of African men and masculinities to which boys and men are exposed, the greater the possibilities are for them to imagine and open up to something else that they had not conceived of or may not have felt ready to admit – including being peacebuilders.

It is out of this body of work that we get four ideas about men and masculinities that offer hope of achieving lasting peace. First, researchers have shown that masculinity is not an essential. Instead of being a biological imperative, masculinity is constructed out of men's relationship with women as well as with other males. Masculinity is made out of the patterns of men's social relations with others which are routinely produced and reproduced not just in spaces such as the military, but also in families, schools, places of work and the media. Actually – and this is the second point – research shows that it is better to

conceive of masculinity as not one thing but as a set of practices, to talk of masculinity in the plural terms. Whereas belief and the support of violence to achieve peace might inform the hegemonic form of militarised masculinity, there are other less violent forms of masculinity, other configurations of men's gender and sexual practices, even within the military. In this regard, the advocacy and gains made to allow gay men into the armed forces in countries such as the US is an important milestone in challenging aspects of the military's dominant heterosexist and homophobic culture. The struggle for gender and sexual equality – against the military and ruling militarised masculine ideologies within society – thus needs to happen well before violent conflagrations occur because violence informed by gender and sexuality hegemony happens as often during peacetimes as it does in war. As we contended, peace without gender and sexual justice for women (and subordinate, 'othered', nonconforming men), without regard to their rights, work, health, bodies and identities, is half-empty, almost meaningless, and hence unsustainable. Third, masculinities change, because what informs them are historically and culturally contingent. Indeed, rather than engaging in a once-off construction, men are always constructing their gender and sexual practice, remaking themselves, 'improving' their behaviour. This they do because they learn about themselves as men in interaction with others, by testing themselves against others, by measuring their present attitudes, beliefs and acts with their attitudes, beliefs and acts in the past. This makes it possible to train and educate men about positive peace. Fourth, masculinities are internally unstable. Hence, according to some researchers, in addition to the necessary attention to the social aspects of masculinities, it is appropriate to be aware of the psychological components of masculinities, especially when it comes to issues of sexuality. Rather than expect stability in men's practices, we have to be aware of unsettledness (e.g. Carrigan et al 1985, Kimmel et al 2005, Morrell 2001).

This needs as strong an emphasis as possible so that there is no doubt at all: men's violence against women, and other men, is reprehensible. Thus, awake to the violence pervading African women's lives, the research literature and theorisation on men in Africa discursively produces African men as nothing but violent. This image of African men is, of course, most stark when it comes to violent conflicts. Are there, then, possibilities for peace in African countries faced with the picture of naturally violent African men? Where are the men working for peace in their communities and countries? Where to find models of peaceful masculinities?

The troubling aspect of the literature on African men, in and outside of war, is that they appear as natural aberrations that can be explained without regard to the structures within which African boys grow up and men learn about gender. It is therefore important to underline again a number of critical points about (African) masculinities. First, masculinities are the products of historical and as often ongoing residual imperialistic, colonialist, patriarchal, structural, symbolic and direct aggression against African people: women and men, girls and boys. Structural, symbolic and direct aggression, as I have indicated, means changing the topic from focus only on direct, armed violence to an understanding of violence as including gender-based and sexual violence, hunger, poverty, lack of

access to health services, inequality, etc. This implies that to challenge the masculine dominance, without challenging the covert and overt manifold aggression against men in their daily lives, is not likely to succeed in the long run. And of course, to work against hunger, for instance, without paying attention, which also happens often enough, to men's gender power, is to perpetuate the half-heartedness of peace for many women. The point here is that African masculinities are products of the structure in which men find themselves and to which they will in turn contribute in the absence of choices available elsewhere. Second, to suggest or deliberately make out African masculinities as one homogenous and unchanging body of practices, and African men as naturally violent, is to work not merely towards making Africa a dark place but also a profitable one for weapon manufactures and a resource-hungry world. This view of African masculinities and men actually limits the possibilities in the everyday lives of all men. Working to imagine different orders is what will loosen the grip of violence and militaristic masculinity on men's lives.

And third, it should be obvious even in the prevailing conditions that some and not all men are violent against women, girls, boys as well as other men. The corollary of that is that the majority of men, from the studies above, are not violent. This complicit and subordinated majority are the constituency with whom peaceworkers need to work to show the ties between militarism and violence that punctuate the drive for a durable peace. It may be because we are scholars – who tend to privilege thinking over other modes of existence – that defining things is seen as important. And so for feminist women and men as well as other critical African scholars, it seems that an unavoidable step in the work around peace and its building is to redefine peace so that peacebuilding efforts will take adequate account of different forms of violence – structural and symbolic as well as interpersonal. Simultaneously, efforts should be made to undertake locally grounded, on-going empirical and theoretical work that will go towards understanding peace even more deeply and challenge the hegemonic masculine cult of militarism that sponsors and encourages negative peace.

The end goal of peacebuilding is not the end of violent conflict; that is a stage in the long march towards positive peace. Even though resolving conflict and ending war is clearly necessary, 'building peace means engaging women as well as men' with the aim of 'rebuilding institutions and society, and achieving sustainable peace' (AusAID 2006: 3). Lasting peace depends on robust and just socioeconomic institutions.

In 'An Agenda for Peace', the then secretary-general of the UN describes post-conflict peacebuilding as, variously, 'the construction of a new environment'; 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'; 'comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people'; and that 'it may take the form of concrete cooperative projects which link two or more countries in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace' (UN 1992: unpaginated; see also UN 1994: 6–7). Even though the

document gave honour and privilege to military ideology and aggression as important to maintaining peace, many elements of this 'agenda' continue to be appropriate. The objective of peacebuilding efforts is the establishment of meaningful, credible and lasting peace. As suggested at the outset, to understand positive peace we have to understand the dominant idea of peace for Africa, which is negative peace. Here the distinction between what exists in many 'post-conflict' African countries and what we should work towards is elaborated by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID):

> A basic definition of peace is the absence of violence, or 'negative peace'. But this can disguise structural forms of violence, such as discrimination, underlying grievances or lack of avenues for challenging existing structures in a peaceful way. 'Positive peace' is characterised by social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. It is supported by political institutions that are able to manage change and resolve disputes without resorting to violent conflict. (DfID 2010: 14)

Among the imperatives that have to be addressed in moving towards positive peace are, as DfID further notes, the 'underlying causes of conflict, … drivers or triggers of conflict, … and … the devastating effects of violent conflict, to enable communities to recover and reconcile, and prevent today's effects becoming tomorrow's causes' (2010: 14). However, 'we should not misconceive "peacebuilding"', as the chair of UN Peacebuilding Commission (2012: 5) has remarked, 'as a term implying a set of tasks, activities or stand-alone mandates … but as "end-state" … achieved when national institutions are capable to deliver security, justice, basic services and jobs.' As we said, the discourse of military security is part of the problem. It is an obstruction positive peace. Even then, the attention to justice, basic services and jobs by the Peacebuilding Commission needs to be supported and made more salient.

In 'post-conflict', postcolonial Africa it is also important to pay far more attention to the histories of affected communities or societies, including but not limited to ordinary African women's and men's multiple histories. Development and socioeconomic justice are, to iterate, imperative in 'post-conflict' societal reconstruction and reconciliation. Socioeconomic injustice, as was suggested, is indeed synonymous with structural violence (Galtung 1969). And as observed in 'An Agenda for Development', in thinking development we cannot assume the existence of peace, as has been done in mainstream approaches to development: the non-existence of peace or existence of fragile peace is a reality that has to be accounted for in many parts of Africa and the world (UN 1994). Development in turn is important for sustainable positive peace. Peace cannot be meaningful and durable without socioeconomic development, specifically the socioeconomic development of women coupled with the transformation of men's gender power. For peace to be possible we do not want soldiers or any other form of warrior, whether engaged in war or trying to be peacekeepers; we need gender-conscious male and female farmers, engineers, doctors, carpenters, builders, artists and other professionals and artisans (Whitworth 2005). That is, we need development and gender and sexual justice as part of peace.

I have illustrated already that the conception of peace in some of the documents on peace from global and continental bodies is troubled by an overt or implied militaristic, masculine approach to peace. In the search to arrive at models for new, broader conceptions of peace while engaging with non-militaristic masculinities, a notable counter-view is found in the thinking of the Australian Agency for International Development. In this thinking it is explicitly noted that:

> preventing conflict means engaging the commitment of men in cultures where masculinity is associated with aggression. In fact, states with high levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience violent interstate conflict. (AusAID 2006: 5)

This for us must mean that building positive peace should entail nurturing the love of gender and sexual equality among men as well as women, and not being shy of paying attention to the socioeconomic structures that produce injustice. But there is a scarcity of work that does this for us. There are few studies specifically on peace and masculinities in Africa. In the absence of immediately relevant tools to transform men towards egalitarian masculinities for the ends of positive peace, a useful existing theoretical resource that can be drawn on for gender training and transformation is the body of global critical studies on men and masculinities which I referred to earlier (e.g. Gibson and Hardan 2005, Kimmel et al 2005, Morrell 2001, Ruspini et al 2011). There are also studies on men's work and activism against violence against women as well as on 'peaceful' activities of men that can be drawn on to mount gender training with men for peace (e.g. Peacock et al 2006; Ratele et al 2011, Richter and Morrell 2006). These might be useful for now, given the paucity of work specific to working with men's genders and masculinities for peace.

Earlier it was stated that where conditions are ill-suited for trying out different ideas of masculinities, violence is a quick way to becoming a man. Under such conditions, to succeed in transforming the dominant model of militarised masculinity and build men for lasting and positive peace, it means addressing the socioeconomic positions of the men, politics which enable or disable them to test different ideas about manhood, and culture they identify with. While still small, there is a growing body of work of profeminist, anti-sexist and anti-violence African men and women (and from others elsewhere in the world) that engages and seeks to transform men, boys and masculinities to support this contention (Barker 1998, Jaji 2009, Morrell 1998, Peacock, Khumalo & McNab 2006, Ratele 2008c, Tamale 2004). Some of this work is focused on developing ideas about how to think of the subject of men and masculinities in an African context, and its aim is to study men and boys as a gender rather than, say, as only or primarily Nigerian, Kikuyu, Muslim, Arab, or as workers, as I have done here. Other related work is focused on changing men and mobilising them away from thinking of themselves as warriors and instead persuading them into working with women towards gender and sexual justice. What we learn from this work is that there is immense value to be mined from studying and engaging men as men. We learn that there are differences between men that must be acknowledged in efforts to train men and transform masculinities. We learn that confronting history and how it locates men is important in working with men so as to show that masculinity does change over time (Kimmel et al 2005: 3). Working with men to

build new forms of peace means understanding, among other things, that men are a gender, and that masculinities must be considered to be: situated; constantly changing; internally differentiated and unfixed; socially produced; spanning both the psychical and social (including economic, political and cultural); intersecting with other social divisions in a society and globally, such as age, religion, ethnicity, language, class, race, culture, sexuality and geography.

Conclusion

Instead of summarising the main arguments in this article, I would like to conclude by highlighting two points. I admit that it may be a scholar's bias that I find it imperative to begin by clarifying and defining the concepts that we use. As such, an important point made in this article is that we have to start by defining and enlarging the meanings of both violence and peace. The argument derives from the understanding that she who defines the object has some authority over it (here reference is being made to the commonly accepted knowledge/power nexus). The assertion that violence is much more than bodily violence and the enlargement of peace are also important: simply put, both violence and peace have tended to be defined *for* Africans, and thus divorced from the conditions in which Africans find themselves. These steps are not about fancy abstractions but actually the foundations of what must inform peace and peacebuilding. In regard to peace, this paper has argued for peace to be considered as deeply connected to socioeconomic justice, even peace as socioeconomic justice, for women and men with respect to meaningful employment, health, education and their bodies.
The levels of gender-based and sexual violence seen in some countries in wartime and post-conflict are possible because of the dominant view of peace and security, that is to say, of peace as having little to do with gender and sexual justice. In addition, though, this paper has argued that the elusiveness of positive peace in much of Africa arises from the fetish for militarised masculinity which is central to militarism, and is employed to rouse men (and women) to patriotism so as to defend the honour of the countries or defined groups with countries, and ultimately for power. The paper sought to underline the interconnections between violence and the dominant view of (militarised) masculinity in order to indicate the difficulties in the way of making durable, positive peace. Even then, the paper was intended to point to possibilities of undoing the gender and sexual order by acknowledging the constructedness, multiplicity, changeability and unsettledness of masculinities. All these add up to the fact that men can be trained out of militaristic ideologies of masculinities and for socioeconomic justice informed by a different gender and sexual order. What is needed, of course, is education and training, but even more importantly, an ongoing struggle for positive peace.

Note

1 I have in mind here stories such as that of 'the Mmupele family [in South Africa] whose four children were overcome by hunger and died on a long walk to find their mother and sister, who had gone in search of food' (Tshehle 2011).

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About the author

Kopano Ratele is a professor in the Institute of Social and Health Sciences (ISHS) at the University of South Africa (UNISA) and co-director of the Medical Research Council-UNISA Safety and Peace Promotion Research Unit (SAPPRU). Kopano's scholarly interests span the areas of violence and fatal injury, critical psychology, sexuality, culture, men and masculinities, and research methodology. He is editor in chief of *African Safety Promotion: A Journal of Injury and Violence Prevention* and current president of the Psychological Society of South Africa. He also co-edited *From Boys to Men: Social Construction of masculinities in Contemporary Society and Inter-Group Relations: South African Perspectives* and *There Was This Goat*, co-authored with Nosisi Mpolweni and Antjie Krog